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 The resurgence of the far-right in European politics has been cause for alarm on a 
continent which so recently suffered the consequences of the rise of fascism in the early 
twentieth century.  Political observers have looked on anxiously while far-right parties in Austria 
and Italy have participated in the governing coalitions of those countries.  In 2002, Jean Marie Le 
Pen stunned the world with his advancement into the second round of the French Presidential 
election.  Why is the radical-right so strong right now?  Why do voters cast their ballots in 
support of far-right parties?  In this thesis, I have examined these questions and offered some 
insight into how far-right parties rose to prominence in France, Italy, Austria, and Belgium.  I 
hypothesize that voters who supported far-right parties in the last parliamentary elections have 
less trust in both domestic and supranational political institutions, follow politics less closely, are 
more likely to feel alienated, and are more likely to feel that immigrants take away jobs than 
their counterparts who supported mainstream parties.  My findings reveal that these hypotheses 
were particularly accurate in France and Belgium, but did not correctly depict the sentiments of 
Italian far-right voters.  This finding suggests that far-right parties are perhaps not as similar as 
some people believe, but are characterized by different goals and platforms that appeal to 












I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The movement to unite Europe politically and economically has been the dominant trend 
in European politics in the post-war era.  What began as an effort to permanently prevent war 
from breaking out on the continent (European Coal and Steel Community 1951) has become an 
unprecedented level of political and economic cooperation which has also coincided with a 
cultural movement to unite Europe‟s disparate peoples.  However, a considerable backlash has 
emerged to the idea of a united Europe, and many far-right parties have taken advantage of 
widespread apprehension regarding the immigration and loss of sovereignty that coincides with 
European Union membership.  These far-right parties have had electoral success which 
culminated in their collaboration in the governments in Italy and Austria, and participation in the 
second-round of the presidential elections in France.  In January of 2007, with the addition of 
Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union, far-right members of the European Parliament 
now have satisfied a threshold that allows their caucus named Identity, Tradition, and 
Sovereignty to be officially recognized and funded.  What are the implications of the resurgent 
far-right for European politics?  Why is the far-right so strong right now? 
 Extreme right movements have emerged in several European countries in the last 20 
years.  As immigration and the signs of greater interdependence with united Europe have 
increased, so too has the demand for far-right parties.  In the contemporary European Union, 
several member states have relevant far-right parties that play a large role in their domestic 
politics; these countries include France, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Bulgaria, and Romania.  In addition, countries such as Sweden, Spain, the UK, Germany, and 




  The viability of far-right parties is largely attributed to an array of 
institutional characteristics and unique features of the domestic political landscape.  However, 
each instance of dramatic success for a far-right party is met with considerable apprehension 
throughout Europe as critics of these extreme parties fear success abroad could translate to 
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II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES 
 Before one can engage in a discussion of far-right parties, it is necessary to establish 
exactly what a far-right party is, as many scholars indicate there is a lack of consensus about the 
characteristics of far-right parties.  Notable examples of labels that are not synonymous with far 
right are New Right and Neoconservative.  New Right is a label appropriate for subscribers of 
Reaganism and Thatcherism which emphasize pro-market economic ideas, privatization, and 
decreasing the role of the state in the economy.  Neoconservative is a term used for 
interventionist foreign policy like that of the Bush Administration which opted for a preemptive 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
In contrast, far-right parties are agreed by many scholars to be influenced primarily by 
the ideology of fascism.
2
  Fascist ideology focuses upon an idea of creating a new revolutionary 
order or new society that has nothing to do with the rotten or decadent former regime.
3
  Fascists 
typically believe that these goals cannot be accomplished by one man, but rather it takes the 
mobilization of the masses and all of the state‟s energy to pursue these reforms.  Typically, 
fascist movements are coalesced around one charismatic figure who seeks to create a cult of 
personality.  Usually this charismatic leader evokes rhetoric such as the nation emerging from a 
dark period, but with the promise of brighter days ahead.
4
 
Piero Ignazi offers what he believes are the key concepts of fascist ideology.
5
     
 Belief in the authority of the state over the individual 
 An emphasis on natural community 
 Distrust for individual representation and parliamentary arrangements 
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 Limitations on personal and collective freedoms 
 Collective identification in a great national destiny 
 An acceptance of the hierarchical principle for social organization. 
 
Not all scholars agree that the contemporary far right has an ideology that is reminiscent 
of fascism.  Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann argue that the new radical right does not 
espouse the characteristics of traditional fascists and is supported by a different base.  “The 
fascist rhetoric was authoritarian, communitarian, and anti-capitalist, a different blend of appeals 
than the new radical right.”
6
  In addition, Kitschelt and McGann point out that parties such as the 
Austrian FPO and the French FN deny any link to fascism.  Of course, these parties have 
incentives to do this, as many countries ban fascist parties that subscribe to the beliefs of Hitler 
and Mussolini.  Furthermore, far-right parties typically incorporate terms such as “democratic” 
and “progressive” into their names, when in reality they support neither of these things.
7
 
James Gregor also believes that the term neo-fascism is commonly used recklessly by 
social scientists to classify parties or movements on the right.  “By the mid-1990‟s, the entry 
criteria for admission into the class of neo-fascists had become increasingly slack.  Any 
opposition to free immigration from anywhere and under any circumstances afforded immediate 
entry-as a „racist‟ into the class of neo-fascists.”
8
  Gregor believes that social scientists and 
politicians are too quick to pronounce certain groups or individuals to be neo-fascists and that 
doing this has dramatic implications for international relations when that party gets into the 
government. 
Matt Golder splits far-right parties into two classifications: neo-fascist parties and 
populist parties.  Golder classifies parties such as the French National Front and Freedom Party 
of Austria as populist because of their emphasis on materialist issues such as the connection of 
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 5 
immigration and unemployment.  He uses the 1984 slogan of Jean-Marie Le Pen to emphasize 
this point; “Two million immigrants is the cause of two million Frenchmen out of work.”
9
  
Golder argues that in contrast, neo-fascist parties are more ideational in nature and are 
characterized by an ideology that closely resembles traditional fascism across the board.  Golder 
maintains that it is important to make this distinction because it is the populist parties that have 
enjoyed recent notable electoral successes while the neo-fascist parties have declined or have had 
stable support for the last 30 years.
10
 
Herbert Kitschelt (1997) further distinguishes between parties generally considered to be 
on the far-right.  Kitschelt argues extreme right parties can be classified into four different 
groups: fascist parties, welfare chauvinist parties, right-authoritarian parties, and populist anti-
state parties.  Kitschelt‟s definition of fascist parties is generally the same as the other scholars‟ I 
have discussed.  Kitschelt‟s right-authoritarian group is a blend of authoritarianism with pro-
market appeals, notably different than the fascist parties of the early to mid-twentieth century.
11
  
Kitschelt‟s third class of welfare chauvinism typically is characterized by attempts to blame 
economic problems on foreigners and immigrants.  In practice, this brand of far-right politics 
produces leaders who “emphasize racist or authoritarian slogans but studiously stay away from 
admiration of liberal market capitalism.”
12
  The final party family Kitschelt discusses is the 
populist anti-state parties that rail against the elite political class and big government.  Kitschelt 
argues that these parties are in reality libertarian in nature, and should not be grouped in with 
radical- right parties.     
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 6 
It is generally agreed upon that far-right parties are quite disparate in policy preferences 
and goals, and work together rather inchoately in the context of European politics.  As Pippa 
Norris states, “(even) parties seen as exemplifying the radical right, such as Lega Nord, the 
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (Freedom Party of Austria or FPO), and the Dansk Folkeparti, 
can also be regarded as highly diverse in their ideological appeals, organizational structures, and 
leadership rhetoric.”
13
  Nevertheless, certain commonalities and features can be observed cross-
nationally that justify the classification of some parties into a family of parties considered to be 
on the far-right. 
  “Given a particular issue that is important to them, for example immigration or the rights 
of asylum, a radical- right position is likely to be more hostile or punitive than those advanced by 
other parties, movements, or persons.”
14
  Peter Merkl elaborates upon this statement by adding 
that radical- right parties are prone to threaten extreme or cruel measures aimed at immigrants or 
foreign-born nationals.  In addition, Leonard Weinberg indicates that far-right parties typically 
adopt a rhetoric that is hostile towards what they refer to as people who seek complicated 
solutions to simple problems.  Merkl adds that far-right parties and individuals reject the notion 
of a marketplace where valid ideas are debated, instead opting to believe that there is one truth, 
that which they believe.
15
   
 Far-right parties are different than traditional conservative parties in both their aims and 
their practices.  Far-right parties in some countries are known for using subversion tactics or 
dirty tricks to achieve their goals.
16
  In addition, far-right movements are typically more prone to 
resort to violence and other extreme manifestations of political views.  Of course, violent 
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behavior is not limited to just radical- right parties, and there are instances where the use of 
excessive force has been authorized by mainstream parties, including brutal police force which 
was approved and covered up by French Interior minister Charles Pasqua from the conservative 
Gaullist (RPR) Party in France.
17
  
 Despite the difficulties in classifying parties as radical right and pinpointing exactly what 
the ideological basis is for their collective movement, recent notable endeavors have sought to 
build an academic consensus as to which parties fit into this extreme- right family.  In 2000, 
Marcel Lubbers sent a questionnaire to 290 political scientists in all fifteen of the EU member 
states at the time as well as Norway and Switzerland.  (150 of the questionnaires were 
successfully completed or 52%)  The political scientists were asked to place European parties on 
an ideological scale of 0-10 with furthest left being “0” and furthest right being “10”.  In 
addition, they were asked to place parties on an immigration scale (0 being not very restrictive to 
10 very restrictive) and the parties‟ past positions on immigration in 1990.  There was a high 
degree of inter-coder reliability, and the results were compared with a similar 1995 effort by 
Hubert and Inglehart to alleviate external validity concerns.  The scores of the two scales were 
highly correlated (R=.99).
18
          
 When placed on a scatter gram with ideological placement on the vertical axis with 
immigration attitudes on the horizontal axis, far-right parties were consistently located in the top-
right region.  In contrast, European Green and Communist Parties typically fell into the lower- 
left region.  The results indicated a remarkable level of similarity between the far-right parties in 
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III. EUROPE’S EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES AND THEIR ELECTORAL FORTUNES 
 My study focuses on four similar countries that have experienced a resurgence of far-
right politics recently.  France, Italy, Austria, and Belgium are all member states of the European 
Union, and all have per capita gross domestic products that group them with the richest countries 
in the world.  Thus, as Ronald Inglehart would argue, each country has a substantial voting 
population that is influenced by post-material concerns when deciding which party to support in 
elections.  Simply stated, this means that these voters have their material needs met, and thus 
devote considerable attention to matters such as the environment or matters of equality.  
Alexandra Cole (2005) and Paul Taggert (1996) have argued that while the left initially benefited 
from this post-materialist trend most notably in regard to the advent of the Green movement, the 
extreme right perhaps is the beneficiary of a backlash against this movement.  While Greens 
view their organization as one that supersedes state boundaries and many of their supporters 
view themselves as a citizen of Europe, far-right parties and their supporters typically evoke a 
spirit of nationalism.  Thus, young far-right voters do not view themselves to be part of the “E-
generation” (a generational movement which identifies its members as citizens of Europe, not 
nation-states) like many of their contemporaries, but rather view themselves to be French, Italian, 
etc.    
 Each of these countries also faced a communist threat in the post-war era, especially in 
Italy where the Communists could draw nearly 40% of the vote.  For all of these countries, 
perhaps with the exception of Belgium, the end of the Cold War began a period of political 
change in the country which coincided with a period of de-alignment from the traditional 
political parties.  Corruption scandals in Austria and Italy may have acted as catalysts to 
accelerate this de-alignment trend, and even strengthen far-right party support due to the fact that 
 9 
these parties were not implicated in the scandals.  In France, it was not widespread corruption, 
but perhaps the dramatic failure and subsequent reversal of the Socialists‟ economic policy under 
President Francois Mitterrand that sparked a de-alignment trend in French politics.     
France 
France‟s Front National (FN) has generally been one of Europe‟s leading far-right parties 
since its creation in 1972.  Front National was created by the leaders of Ordre nouveau, a 
nationalist movement that was created in 1969 to overcome the fragmentation of France‟s 
political right.  The FN has based its policies primarily around the issues of immigration, 
security, and unemployment.
20
  Led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, Front National sought to appeal to 
Catholics, authoritarians, conservatives, imperialists, and racists.
21
  
 Le Pen had been the campaign manager of far-right presidential candidate Tixier-
Vignancourt in 1965.  A veteran of the Algerian war, Le Pen is a charismatic figure with a 
proven ability to appeal to those who are frustrated with the French government.  Le Pen rejects 
the idea of human equality, and blames immigrants and leftists for France‟s deteriorating 
cultural, political, and economic clout.
22
  Le Pen and Front National have attempted to appeal to 
the nationalist tradition of the French Revolution and thousands of years of history.   
 The FN was politically marginal for the first decade of its existence, but performed well 
in the 1983 and 1984 local and European elections.  It is important to note that the 1983 elections 
took place in an atmosphere of widespread apprehension regarding the French economy which 
was suffering extremely high rates of inflation as a result of the 1981-83 Keynesian spending of 
the Socialist government led by President Francois Mitterrand.  In response to the deleterious 
effects of this fiscal policy, the French Socialists had to undertake a dramatic reversal of the 
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nationalization and government spending that had characterized their first two years in power.  
The fallout from this important event has been a notable de-alignment trend in French politics as 
the convergence in fiscal policies advocated by center-right and center-left has softened the 
cleavages that had characterized French politics in the post-war era.    
Since the early 1980‟s, the National Front has polled between 10-15 percent of the vote in 
presidential, parliamentary, regional, and European elections.
23
  The FN has survived several 
high-profile defections in the late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s which are largely attributed to Le 
Pen‟s controversial remarks regarding Jews, extreme stances, and views on the Gulf War.
24
   
Nevertheless, the party has garnered a consistently strong vote share and Le Pen‟s status of head 
of the party is unquestioned.      
 The pinnacle of Front National‟s success to date was the second-round participation of 
Jean Marie Le Pen in the 2002 presidential elections.  Crippled by the vote splitting of the left, 
Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin shockingly failed to advance to the second round of the 
election with incumbent President Jacques Chirac.  Thus French voters in 2002 were 
subsequently faced with a decision between the center-right and far-right, and international 
observers were quick to condemn the election and Le Pen‟s participation.  Ultimately, Jacques 
Chirac was re-elected with roughly 82% of the vote.
25
   
 Jean Marie Le Pen is running for the French presidency again this year, and is currently 
polling around 15% of the vote again.  Political observers are generally doubtful that he will 
advance to the second round again, but it is important to note that Le Pen, like most politicians 
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on the far right, typically perform better in elections than polls reflect on account that some 




The Italian far-right has also risen to prominence recently and boasts the first far-right 
party to participate in the government of a Western European democracy since 1945.
27
  The 
contemporary Italian far-right dates back all the way to 1946, just two years after fascist dictator 
Benito Mussolini was overthrown.  However, the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) 
garnered paltry electoral success for the first 45 years of its existence.    
 The Italian electoral system in the Cold War era was dominated by three parties:  the 
Christian Democrats (DC), the Socialists (PSI), and the Communists (PCI).  Backed by the 
United States politically and financially, the Christian Democrats participated in every 
government from 1946-1994.  The Italian Communists typically received between 25-40 percent 
of the vote (mostly from Central Italy) but were always excluded from the governing coalition.  
Given the relatively large threat from the Communist Party, Italian voters typically backed the 
Christian Democrats or Socialists solely to keep the Communists out of power. 
 In the 1980‟s, Italy experienced a rapid period of economic growth and prosperity that 
later would be dubbed “the Italian Miracle”.  The period of economic growth even impacted the 
southern region of Italy typically referred to as the Mezzogiorno, which has long lagged behind 
the rest of the country in terms of modernization and economic infrastructure.  As a result of this 
economic growth, Italian voters may have undergone a period of de-alignment from the major 
three parties that had dominated Italian politics throughout the post-war era.
28
  The end of the 
Cold War brought on by the breakup of the Soviet Union further accelerated the de-alignment 
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trend and Italian politics underwent a period of rapid transformation.  The PCI abandoned 
Marxism and reinvented itself as the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS).  However, the most 
important catalyst for the shakeup of the Italian political system was the series of political 
scandals that came to light in the mid 1990s‟. 
 In 1982, Banco Ambrosiano collapsed spectacularly and suddenly largely in part to its 
chairman Alberto Calvi who was involved in an illegal masonic lodge called Propaganda Due 
(P2).  Banco Abrosiano was established in 1896 by Giuseppe Tovini to be a Catholic-affiliated 
bank that would serve moral purposes such as acquiescing charitable efforts.  The Vatican indeed 
has a well-documented collaboration with Banco Ambrosiano (which was often referred to as 
“Priests‟ Bank”) that lasted for decades, even though the former‟s financial affairs are routinely 
kept highly discrete.
29
   In the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, Banco Ambrosiano began to expand its scope 
and it opened a holding company in Luxembourg (known for its tolerance of discrete banking 
practices) in 1964.  In addition, the Banco Ambrosiano, under the leadership of Calvi, created a 
number of offshore companies in the Bahamas and South America.  Banco Ambrosiano was 
believed to be integral in funding the Contras in Nicaragua and Solidarity in Poland (which was 
largely believed to be funded primarily by the Vatican Bank).     
 Aforementioned, Calvi was involved in the illegal masonic lodge Propaganda Due (P2).  
P2, which was composed of journalists, parliamentarians, industrialists, and military leaders, was 
such a prominent player in Italian politics since the 1960‟s, that it was often regarded as a state 
within a state.  P2 was involved in every aspect of Italian politics until the 1982 collapse of 
Banco Ambrosiano.    In fact, many people believe that P2 was responsible for the death of Pope 
John Paul I, who mysteriously died just 33 days into his Papal term after he had expressed 
interest in reforming the Vatican‟s finances.  According to CIA agent Richard Brenneke, P2 was 
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funded by the United States largely due to the prominent notion that P2 would state a coup in 
event of the Communist Party‟s takeover of the government.      
   After the spectacular collapse of Banco Ambrosiano, an investigation by magistrates 
revealed that hundreds of politicians had been diverting state funds to their own accounts for 
personal and political use.  In 1992, Socialist politician Mario Chiesa was caught red-handed 
taking a bribe.  Subsequently, Judge Antonio Di Pietro ordered the arrest of Chiesa, and the 
ensuing trial brought to light many other instances of corruption.  The magnitude and the depth 
of the corruption led many to believe that the problems were systemic in nature, and the Italian 
political system was mocked by millions of Italians who dubbed it Tangentopoli (Bribeville).     
As a result of the ensuing Mani pulite (clean hands) campaign, the Christian Democrats‟ 
electoral fortunes were dramatically hampered, and the party suffered substantial losses in the 
1992 elections and ultimately was ousted from the government in the 1994 elections.
30
 
 Excluded from the government since its creation in 1946, MSI was untouched by the 
scandal and its surrounding upheaval.  The proportional nature of the Italian electoral system 
ensured that the MSI members would always account for roughly 5% of the Italian Parliament.   
However the MSI (running under the name Alleanza Nazionale) dramatically improved its 
electoral fortunes in the 1994 elections, when it was rewarded by an Italian electorate which had 
become distrustful of the predominant political parties with 13.5% of the vote, which ultimately 
became enough for inclusion in the government led by Silvio Berlusconi‟s Forza Italia.  This was 
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 Many scholars believe that the AN‟s success in the early 1990‟s was in part due to Silvio 
Berlusconi who legitimized some of the AN‟s concerns.  The main goal of Italian political 
parties in the early 1990‟s was to attract voters from the center-left Socialists and center-right 
Christian Democrats who were leaving their parties rapidly in response to the corruption 
revealed by the Mani Pulite campaign.  Berlusconi‟s Forza Italia (FI) was in many respects an 
effort to prevent these centrist voters from joining ranks with the far-left Communists.  Forza 
Italia evoked national sentiment and pride (its English translation is “Go Italy”) in a similar 
manner to Berlusconi‟s soccer franchise AC Milan.  In founding Forza Italia, Berlusconi hoped 
to create the first ever Italian party on the right that was sympathetic to business and bourgeoisie 
interests.   
 Berlusconi and AN leader Gianfranco Fini agreed to run on a common platform in the 
1994 elections called the Pole of Good Government.
32
  The Pole of Good Government produced 
a common slate of FI and AN candidates in southern and central Italy.  In addition, Berlusconi 
struck a similar deal in northern Italy with Umberto Bossi, the head of the separatist Northern 
League.
33
  Alleanza Nazionale is an interesting far-right party in the sense that it is relatively 
sympathetic to Italians who rely on the state for financial assistance.  In the 1994 election, Fini 
routinely advocated big government and commitment to Italy‟s relatively poor Mezzogiorno.  In 
contrast, Forza Italia advocated Reagan/Thatcher economics which included tax cuts, 
privatization, and a reduction of the state‟s role.
34
  The AN is a far-right party for its emphasis on 
Italian nationalism and platform against immigration and multiculturalism.
35
  Whatever the 
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differences are between Forza Italian and Alleanza Nazionale, their Pole of Good Government 
was united in the notion that the left was unsuitable to govern Italy. 
The AN inherited roughly 20% of the vote share of the PSI and DC, the bulk of which 
joined Forza Italia.  The majority of the AN‟s new-found support came from new voters.  In the 
1994 elections, Alleanza Nazionale (AN) performed very well amongst young voters who are far 
removed from Italy‟s fascist past.  Even in Northern Italy, support for AN was quite impressive.  
However, the young base of the AN was not able to help to help the party in the Senate elections 
(voters must be at least 25 to vote for Senators) and the AN performed considerably worse in 
those contests.  Nevertheless, the 1994 elections were a dramatic success for the AN, which had 
tripled its vote share in central and southern Italy (going from 6.9% and 7.2% to 19.4% and 
21.8% respectively).  In addition, the AN doubled its vote share in Northern Italy and Tuscany 
and emerged as the largest party (21.8%) in Lazio the area which includes Rome.
36
   
The AN‟s inclusion in the government immediately became a controversial subject in 
Italian and European politics.  While Berlusconi reassured Europe that all the members of his 
coalition were committed to democracy, 200 NAZI -saluting neo-fascist skinheads took to the 
streets in Vicenza to celebrate the AN‟s inclusion into the government.  In addition, Fini made 
comments praising fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, further irritating critics of his inclusion in 
the Italian government.  Even more disturbing, the soon to be head of foreign affairs, Mirko 
Tremaglia, demanded that Italy disown the Treaty of Osimo which defined Italy‟s boarders with 
Yugoslavia.     
 The other far-right party that would ultimately participate in the government led by Silvio 
Berlusconi was the Northern League (LN).  Led by fiery Umberto Bossi, the Northern League is 
a collection of separatist movements in Northern Italy.  The industrial northern region of Italy 
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has experienced rapid economic growth throughout the post-war era, and sympathizers of 
northern succession believe that the poorer, less-developed south is an archaic burden.  Bossi and 
many of his supporters hope that northern Italy will someday become a sovereign state called 
Padania. 
 Like the AN, the Northern League is somewhat of an oddity amongst far-right parties.  
According to the Lubbers expert scale, the LN is located at 7.55 on the 10-point ideological scale 
(1 being Communist, 10 being Nationalist) which is less extreme than Alleanza Nazionale and 
many other prominent far-right parties.  However, the LN‟s placement of 9 on a 10-pt immigrant 
scale places them well within the far-right context.
37
 
 Unlike his AN counterpart Gianfranco Fini, Umberto Bossi is viewed to be crude and 
unrefined.  His politics are often compared to Austrian far-right leader Jorg Haider, who is also 
very unpopular throughout Europe.  Bossi has embarrassed himself several times including 
instances where he claimed that the party “had a boner” and his instruction to a critic who waved 
an Italian flag to protest his demonstration that she should hang that flag in a toilet.  Fini and 
Berlusconi worked together seamlessly in the1994 election and subsequently Fini maintained his 
support for Berlusconi‟s government.  In contrast, Bossi proved difficult to work with throughout 
much of the 1994 campaign, and had even discredited his AN coalition partners.  Scholars such 
as Tom Gallagher believe the only reason Bossi‟s LN begrudgingly cooperated with Berlusconi‟s 
Forza Italia was to avoid marginalization in a time period of rapid change and realignment.   
 The Northern League immediately benefited from Italy‟s structural adjustments 
following the collapse of the First Republic in 1994.  Hoping to stabilize domestic politics, the 
Italians scrapped their proportional system for awarding seats in the Parliament in lieu of a 
system in which 75% of the seats were awarded in first-passed-the-post elections in single-
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member districts.  Prior research of political scientists such as Giovanni Sartori, Matthew Soberg 
Shugart, and John Carey indicates that parties whose support is densely concentrated into a 
particular region can benefit from single-member district elections because they are virtually 
guaranteed to win seats in the districts in that region.  Indeed the Northern Leagued did perform 
very well in Northern Italy in the 1994 elections and was able to win enough seats to participate 
in the government, despite the fact that the party did not even run candidates in most of Italy‟s 
districts.   
 In December 1994, just five months after the coalition government under Berlusconi was 
sworn in, the LN left the coalition and turned over power to the center-left led by Romano Prodi.  
However, the Freedom Pole maintained solidarity while mitigated to the back benches, and polls 
in 1995 revealed Fini to be Italy‟s most popular politician.
38
  The center-left Prodi government 
lasted until 1996, becoming the second longest lasting Italian government in the post-war era.  In 
the 1996 elections, the AN improved its showing (from 13.5% in 1994 to 15.7%) and their 
success ensured the return to power of the Freedom Pole coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi.   
 The AN has seemingly established itself as a major party in Italian politics, even as the 
LN‟s viability has diminished.  While offering some policies that are generally deemed to be 
acceptable, the AN is still considered by many to be an unacceptable governing party.  Italy has 
not been punished by the EU due to the AN‟s participation in the government, but officials from 
Germany, Spain, Greece, and Portugal were all concerned that the AN‟s inclusion in 
Berlusconi‟s government could legitimize far-right parties in their respective countries.  In 
addition, Danish and Belgian ministers in the past have refused to shake hands with their 
counterparts in the AN. 
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Austria 
 The success of Austria‟s far-right party, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), has created 
panic in Austria and throughout Europe about the commitment to democracy in that country.  
Unlike countries such as France, Austria had not developed a liberal democratic political culture 
prior to the end of World War II in 1945.  In fact, the Austrians were quite skeptical of Western 
European powers and other foreigners, and believed that Austria must protect its Germanic 
heritage from inferior foreign people.  However, in the aftermath of World War II, the Austrians 
quickly recognized that they needed to cooperate with Western powers to stave off the threat of 
Communism from Moscow.  Included in the Marshall Plan, Austria begrudgingly accepted its 
fate as being somewhat dependent upon the Western democracies.   
Nevertheless, the threat of 536,000 Austrians who were members of the NAZI party was 
immediately felt by the fledgling democratic regime.  The Austrians were faced with a dilemma 
of having to both appear eager to rapidly democratize while not permanently alienating this large 
protest vote from the political establishment.  Created in 1955 to integrate these former NAZIS 
into mainstream politics, the FPO remained politically marginal at roughly 5% of the vote until 
the 1980‟s.
39
   In addition, the FPO adopted more moderate policy positions and ejected 
extremist elements.  This transformation paid off in 1983 when the FPO joined the governing 
coalition led by the Austrian Socialists.
40
  
Despite an initially tough political landscape, the Austrians were remarkably successful at 
cultivating democratic institutions and managing a growing economy.  “Elite co-operation could 
be held to have changed Austria from a violently divided society to a model consociational 
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  Indeed, the Austrians had developed a welfare state modeled after the most generous 
countries in Scandinavia, which Duncan Morrow credits for achieving social peace in Austria.  




In the 1970‟s there were signs of a de-alignment trend in Austrian politics.  The Roman 
Catholic Church and the Austrian Socialists mended ties, after a generation of feud following 
World War II.  In addition, the media environment began to rapidly change, and Austria‟s party-
dominated press declined in its hegemony.  In 1978, the entire Austrian political establishment 




In the 1980‟s many of Europe‟s economies, including Austria‟s, entered a period of 
recession.  Unemployment increased (but was still lower than Austria‟s European counterparts) 
and the economic landscape proved favorable to flexible labor markets and larger farms.  
Exacerbating the economic difficulties, the governing Austrian Socialists suffered political 
setbacks brought on by a series of scandals in 1983.  Austrians across the ideological spectrum 
were unhappy with their leading political parties in the 1980‟s.  The Austrian Socialists faced a 
revolt from disenchanted student groups and ecologists who were sympathetic to the left.  The 
Austrian Christian Democratic center-right encountered anger from a fractionalized conservative 
electorate including the relatively rich and educated new right, and the less skilled workers who 
were vulnerable to the tumultuous economic situation.
44
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In 1986, political upheaval ensued after revelations that Christian Democratic 
Presidential candidate and former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim had 
lied about his war record.  The matter was investigated by the World Jewish Congress in New 
York, and immediately a taboo in Austrian politics emerged to the surface.  Austria‟s war record 
became a prominent topic of discussion, and the Austrian Christian Democrats debated fiercely 
with the World Jewish Congress.  The rhetoric of the election was such that a vote for Waldheim 
was a vote for Austria and the press was saturated with anti-Semitic sentiment.   
 In this political climate, Jorg Haider saw his opportunity to enter the forefront of Austrian 
politics.  In an intra-party coup staged at the party congress in Innsbruck, Haider seized power of 
the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) who at the time had been aligned with the Socialists.  
Amidst overt displays of neo-Nazi celebration that shocked the mainstream political 
establishment, the Austrian Socialists began to construct the policy of Ausgrenzung meaning 
exclusion or putting beyond the pale.
45
 
 Haider adopted an unbridled political campaign style very similar to the Northern 
League‟s Umberto Bossi.  Having absolutely no responsibility in governing Austria, the FPO 
was free to rail against the establishment, and their campaign themes included corruption, too 
much foreign influence, the alleged arrogance of the EU, and the romantic values of the “little 
man”.
46
  Their vote-maximizing strategy was primarily aimed at people who were losers in the 
modernization Austria had undergone since the Second World War.  In addition, Haider sought 
to appeal to segments in the other parties that were frustrated with the general nature of partisan 
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politics.  In the national elections of 1986, the FPO doubled its vote share to 9.6%, despite the 
defection of the entire liberal wing of the party.
47
 
 The dramatic split between the FPO and Socialists initially benefited both parties, and 
their rhetoric became increasingly hostile to mobilize their respective bases.  Haider however 
was not content to be mitigated to a fiery opposition, and embarked upon measures to increase 
his party‟s notability in Austrian politics.  His FPO party lacked the organizational structure of 
Austria‟s other prominent parties, but that allowed Haider significant freedom to politically 
maneuver how he wanted to.  “Analysis of the FPO electorate in 1986 established that Haider‟s 
personality was the greatest single factor in the party‟s appeal.  Voters apparently identified 
Austria‟s FPO as a breath of fresh air in Austria‟s frozen political landscape.”
48
 
 Haider‟s FPO was able to replace the liberals who left the party in droves with Austria‟s 
new rich and the disillusioned.  To accentuate his support amongst the latter, Haider would 
articulate any sort of popular resentment Austrians had towards their government.  The initial 
increase in support for the FPO came at the expense of Austria‟s Christian Democrats.  The 
subsequent elections continued this trend and the FPO reached 15% in 1990 and had a vote share 
equal to that of the Christian Democrats in 1994.
49
  In addition, the FPO had dramatic successes 
in the 1988 and 1989 provincial elections, and most surprisingly performed very well in 
provinces which had long been dominated by the Socialists such as Carinthia.  In the 1989 
provincial elections, the FPO emerged as the second-largest party in that province and with that 
showing put the Austrian policy of excluding the FPO into crisis.  Anti-socialists and right-wing 
Catholics who supported the Christian Democrats (who placed third in the Carinthian 1989 
elections) argued that to further exclude Haider‟s FPO only created more opportunities for him to 
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exploit the government‟s failures.  Despite the fact that the Christian Democrat‟s national policy 
was to exclude the FPO, the local Christian Democrats entered into a coalition with the FPO, 
making Haider the governor of Carinthia.
50
    
 Haider proved to be controversial from the onset of his inclusion into political office.  He 
attended services for German veterans and lavished praise upon Carinthians who had resisted 
Slovene encroachments in 1920.  However it was his remark made in a heated economic 
argument that ultimately broke the Carinthian deal with the Christian Democrats.  “In the Third 




 Haider quickly was saved from his own political misfire.  The collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall had coincided with a spike in Eastern European 
immigration into Austria.  In the early 1990‟s, Haider began to adopt rhetoric that was 
particularly hostile to this wave of immigrants.  With slogans such as “Vienna for the Viennese”, 
Haider and his radical FPO were now appealing to working-class Socialists who feared having to 
compete with these immigrants for jobs.  In the 1991 elections, the FPO garnered 22.5% of the 
vote in Vienna, and threatened the Socialists who had dominated that city since 1945.
52
 
 Haider‟s success was accompanied by a disturbing movement amongst the Austrian 
people.  In the early 1990‟s there were instances of vandalism to the graves of Jewish people and 
Viennese police had raided the headquarters of a far-right splinter group to find powerful 
explosive weapons.  Haider‟s rhetoric became increasingly emboldened as well, and he even 
questioned the legitimacy of Austria‟s Second Republic, a position that even Jean Marie Le Pen 
does not advocate in France.  In addition, Haider argued that Austria was not truly a free country, 
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but rather a state that was dominated by a group of parties that were suitable to the victorious 
Allies.  Haider advocated a Third Republic that abolished compulsory membership in Austria‟s 
political institutions and ended Austria‟s permanent neutrality.
53
 
 By 1994, Haider‟s FPO had such a large block in the Austrian Parliament that it was 
impossible for the Socialists and Christian Democrats to pass constitutional amendments without 
them.
54
  The FPO continued to rail against the European Union, and had built a large and diverse 
vote base.  The FPO in the mid 1990‟s did best amongst unskilled workers (its vote share of 
unskilled labor was roughly equal to that of the Socialists) and new rich.  However, the FPO was 
shunned by intellectuals and the university-educated middle class.   
 Haider‟s political successes culminated in the FPO‟s participation in the Austrian 
government with the right-wing People‟s Party in 2000.  This was met with widespread 
condemnation in Austria and the European Union.  In 2000, the other 14 EU member states 
ceased normal relations with Austria, but quickly reversed that decision a few months later when 
cooler heads prevailed.  Haider was ultimately forced to resign in 2002, and has since split from 
the FPO and formed another party which so far has garnered little success.
55
       
Belgium 
 Belgium also has significant far-right parties, but their success has been rather limited 
compared to France, Italy, or Austria‟s radical right movements.  The French-speaking region of 
Belgium has a sister party of France‟s National Front.  Although the Belgian FN models their 
slogans and campaigns after those of Le Pen, the party‟s peak success to date is 2.9% of vote in 
the 1994 Belgian elections to the European Parliament.
56
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 The notable radical- right party in Belgium is solely an Antwerp (located in Flanders) 
phenomenon.  The Vlaams Blok (VB) is a xenophobic party that was created in 1978 in a split 
from the moderate People‟s Union.  Vlaams Blok initially was a conglomeration of Flemish 
nationalists who were devoted to the idea of Flemish succession from Belgium‟s French-
speaking half.  However, the initial success of the party seemed to have little to do with this 
cause, and could largely be attributed to Vlaams Blok‟s radical anti-immigration stances.
57
  
 In 1988, Filip Dewinter, a member of the Belgian Parliament, became the leader of the 
VB faction in Antwerp.  He reorganized the party into what Marc Swyngedouw calls a Stalinist 
structure in which small, active groups in different neighborhoods became different specialized 
branches of the party structure.  By 1989, he had shifted VB‟s income sources from dues-paying 
party members to state public financing.
58
 
 Dewinter adopted a flourish of rhetoric that was fiercely anti-immigrant in nature.  He 
argued that immigrants received special treatment from the government and that the mainstream 
parties in Belgium did nothing to combat this.  Given the party structure, supporters of the VB 
were present whenever significant events concerning immigrants were occurring including 
openings of mosques and Muslim prayer houses.  Dewinter blamed problems such as crime and 
decline of urban areas in Belgium on these immigrant groups and argued that they could not be 
addressed until these people were deported.  Vlaams Bloc essentially believes that people are not 
equal, and that a hierarchy of races characterizes society.  According to their hierarchy, the 
Flemish are at the top of this vertically- integrated-vision of society with Dutch and Afrikaners 
behind, followed by assimilated French-speaking Belgians, and in last non-European immigrants 
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who don‟t speak Flemish.  Analysis of the 1985 and 1987 elections revealed that Vlaams Blok 
did best amongst underprivileged, urban areas in Belgian‟s Flanders region.
59
 
 However, in the 1988 municipal elections, Vlaams Blok had noticeably extended its 
reach into prosperous sections of Antwerp which traditionally supported Belgium‟s Liberal 
Party.  This was largely attributed to an increase in urban crime, which began to be associated 
with immigrants.  In addition, the media began to run stories about the disheartened Antwerp 




 By the 1991 national elections, VB‟s proportion of the vote had risen to over 10% in 
Flanders.  However, the pinnacle of success for Vlaams Blok came in the 1994 municipal 
elections in Antwerp where the VB drew support from all other parties to an astounding 28.5% 
of the vote and 18 of the 55 seats on Antwerp‟ city council.  In addition to drawing voters from 
virtually every other party in Belgium, Vlaams Blok received roughly equal support from men 
and women in the 1994 elections.  However, the VB‟s base was overwhelmingly composed of 
individuals representing the lowest level of educational attainment in Belgian society.
61
   
 Subsequent to this dramatic local success, Vlaams Blok supporters began to widen their 
scope from a one-issue party focused on immigration.  VB party activists railed against legalized 
abortion and integration with Europe, and voiced their positions on a number of other issues as 
well as their vision for society.  However, the party had to maneuver carefully in order to comply 
with a 1981 Belgian law that outlawed xenophobia and racism in Belgian politics.  As the party 
experienced electoral success, VB partisans became increasingly emboldened to speak their 
minds on controversial issues.  In 2002, then Vice President of the VB Roeland Raes gave an 
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interview on Dutch television in which he cast doubt on the number of Jews killed in the 
Holocaust and the authenticity of Anne Frank‟s Diary.
62
  In 2004, the Belgian Supreme Court 
ruled that Vlaams Blok behaved in a matter inconsistent with the 1981 law, and ordered the party 
to renounce its racism and pay a fine of 40,000 Euros.  The leaders of Vlaams Blok decided to 
renovate the party, and in 2004 disbanded Vlaams Blok and started Vlaams Belang (Flemish 
Interest).
63
   
 The revival of far-right parties is by no means confined to the four cases I have discussed.  
A recent wave of Muslim immigration to the Netherlands has prompted a movement within 
Dutch society to protect Dutch culture from this influx of foreign customs.  The presence of 
Muslims in the Netherlands is so profound that one Dutch student I spoke with while in 
Amsterdam expressed to me his argument that the Netherlands is practically a Muslim country 
due to the combination of secularization amongst the native Dutch and the influx of actively-
practicing Muslims.  While this student in particular had no qualms about this, many other Dutch 
confront this issue with a considerable amount of apprehension.  In the 1970‟s the Dutch 
People‟s Union (NVU) expressed these concerns and presented a platform that was very hostile 
to immigrants (including placing asylum seekers into labor camps).
64
  However, this party was 
far too radical for the Netherlands, and quickly faded into obscurity.  Recently, the Center Party 
(CP) and the Center Democrats (CD) have enjoyed some success in injecting far-right 
viewpoints into the political discourse in the Netherlands, but have not enjoyed the successes of 
some other far-right Western European parties. 
 The Scandinavian countries, which have extremely high tax rates and high GDP per 
capita, also have a significant far-right presence.  Denmark‟s Danish Progress Party stunned 
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political observers with an impressive 15.9% of the vote in the 1973 Danish elections.
65
  
Norway‟s Fremskrittpartiet received between 3.7-13% of the votes in that country throughout the 
1990‟s and had a considerable amount of influence on the mainstream parties primarily on 
immigration matters due to a blackmail influence.
66
  Even Sweden‟s far-right New Democracy 
party has broken 6% of the vote and participated in the parliament before losing all their seats in 
the 1994 election.  Far-right parties in Scandinavia primarily focus their attention on reducing the 
tax rate and minimizing the state‟s influence in the economy.
67
   
 Studies that are characterized by focus upon differences in far-right parties will likely 
include discussion of Switzerland‟s extreme right led by the Swiss People‟s Party (SVP).  Led by 
the charismatic and outspoken Christoph Blocher, the SVP enjoyed a considerable amount of 
success by capitalizing on anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiments in Swiss society.  The SVP, 
like the Scandinavian far-right, survives despite operating in a country with a stable democratic 
tradition and affluent electorate.   
 The far-right‟s success disturbingly is making its way into former-Communist states in 
Eastern and Central Europe.  In 2007, the far-right‟s caucus in the European Parliament known 
as Identity, Sovereignty, and Tradition satisfied a threshold for recognition and funding thanks to 
the accession of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union.   
 Michael Shafir argues that Romania‟s far-right tradition dates back to the inter-war 
period and was heavily influenced by far-right movements on the Western half of the continent.  
He argues that these values combined with Communism in the aftermath of World War II would 
provide the basis for the Romanian version of national Communism.
68
  However, due to the 
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dramatic difference in political development in the post-war era, it is difficult to classify Eastern 
European radical right parties with their counterparts in the West.  In Romania, Shafir argues 
there needs to be a distinction between radical continuity parties and radical return parties.  
Radical continuity parties are the inheritors of national communism, but they typically avoid 
adjectives such as “socialist” in lieu of terms like “workers” or “progress”.
69
  Shafir argues that 
these parties actively engage in efforts to deflect the blame of mistakes or problems of the past 
onto other groups in the society.  In Romania, these groups typically are Jews, Roma, and 
Hungarians.  Specifically with regard to the Jews, Romanian far-right extremists construct a 
vision of Jews trying to take over the world by means of supranational institutions such as the 
European Union or World Bank.
70
  A prominent concern in Romanian politics is that 
international finance organizations will turn Romanian citizens into their slaves.
71
  Radical return 
parties can be distinguished from the radical continuity parties primarily due to their intent to 
return the political discourse to what it was in the inter-war period.  Heavily influenced by the 
fascism of Hitler and Mussolini, radical return parties in Romania are viewed with a considerable 
degree of apprehension by political observers. 
 Levels of trust in political institutions in Romania are considerably lower than those in 
the Western European countries in my study.  The institutions that are most trusted in Romania 
are the Church and the Army, both which typically espouse conservative values.  
 Considerable far-right movements have also formed in Poland, Bulgaria, Belarus, the 
Ukraine, and Russia.  In addition, Latin America, the Middle East, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Canada, and the United States have all experienced movements that could be 
classified into the radical right family.  Pippa Norris argues that data has to be collected in all of 
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these countries and scholars need to include them into their studies in order to enhance our 
understanding of the similarities and differences of radical right parties throughout the world.   




















IV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The recent successes of radical right parties have coincided with a plethora of scholarly 
literature devoted to understanding this phenomenon.  As I previously mentioned, before we can 
study radical right parties, we must first have a general consensus as to what far-right parties are.     
The Politics of the Extreme Right (1997) edited by Paul Hainsworth is a comprehensive 
state by state analysis of far- right movements by area studies scholars who each examine one 
country.  The result is an informative overview of the unique political climate in each country 
that either is conducive to success for radical- right parties or occlusive of their efforts to become 
viable.  Hainsworth‟s book offers one of the most detailed accounts of each radical right party in 
Europe.  The overall work is ultimately successful at dealing with each radical- right party‟s 
individual success as a result of unique domestic and external factors, but does not focus its 
attention on thinking of the radical right as a supranational movement. 
 Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (1997, 2003) evoke a similar strategy of grouping 
together area studies scholars‟ work regarding individual radical- right movements.  Examining 
the successes of the extreme right in both the 1990‟s and re-visiting the topic in the early twenty-
first century, Merkl and Weinberg offer valuable insight into the evolution of far-right 
movements and the varying degrees of electoral success.  Merkl and Weinberg additionally offer 
a rich theoretical basis for the far-right‟s resurgence in contemporary European politics.  Merkl 
and Weinberg include recent waves of immigration, changing family structures, and altered 
gender roles in society as possible reasons for a European political climate that is generating 
support for far-right movements. 
 Some studies seek to trace the origins of the far-right parties that have emerged as 
challengers to the mainstream parties in several prominent Western European countries in the 
 31 
last two decades.  Alexandra Cole (2005) examines whether prominent radical right parties 
belong in the category of new or old right.  Cole‟s work is an excellent discussion of the different 
meanings of left and right since the French Revolution in 1789.  Cole argues that the old left 
advocated notions such as liberty and equality, and the old right was a reaction against this 
movement.  However, Cole argues that a trend of postmodernism, as defined by Ronald 
Inglehart, transformed the left into focusing on matters such as environmental movement and 
eradicating racism.  Thus, Cole argues that the new-right is a response to this new- left, and 
many of the far-right parties such as France‟s National Front, Austria‟s FPO, and Germany‟s 
Republikaner party fit the description of new- right.
72
       
 Cole‟s work was heavily influenced by a study conducted by Paul Taggert (1996).  
Taggert writes: 
 “The wave of crisis that hit Western Europe in the 1970‟s provided the momentum for 
the tides of protest that have characterized the 1980‟s and 1990‟s.  This protest came first from 
the left with the Green parties, the alternative politics and what was to crystallize into the New 
Politics.  We are only now witnessing the equivalent protest on the right.  Mending together 
issues of taxation, immigration and radical regionalism, across western European parties of the 
right are protesting not only the polices but the politics of the old parties.  This New Populism, is 
in many respects, the mirror image of the New Politics (and derives) from the same deep 




Pia Nigge (1998) tests three popular explanations for radical right success: economic 
conditions such as unemployment and inflation, dissatisfaction with the regime, and rising levels 
of immigration.
74
   A somewhat counter-intuitive and unexpected result, Nigge found that a 
declining national economy actually decreases the electoral appeal of far-right parties. 
 Bernt Hagtvet (1994) reaches a different conclusion in his study of right-wing extremism 
in Europe.  Hagtvet found that the interaction between a feeble middle class combined with 
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fragmentation of parties on the traditional right promotes a political landscape that is vulnerable 
to the emergence of a credible radical- right party.  Hagtvet also emphasizes the severity of this 
situation, as far-right politics are often associated with a variety of extremist, violent political 
behavior that may target immigrants, asylum-seekers, and even the homeless or disabled.
75
   
 Aforementioned, studies such as Ignazi (1992), Kitschelt (1997), and Golder (2003) have 
devoted significant attention to the question of how to classify far-right parties.  Ignazi maintains 
there is a difference between traditional far-right parties whose ideology is reminiscent of 
fascism and contemporary far-right parties that have risen to prominence in post-industrial 
societies.  Ignazi includes Alleanza Nazionale into this former category, noting that from its 
inception in the late 1940‟s (as the MSI) it has been characterized by nostalgia for the inter-war 
fascist period.  Ignazi states that these fascist parties “express anti-democratic values, are hostile 
to foreigners, and search for harmony (amongst the native-born population within a given state), 
and an exaltation of natural community.”
76
  These parties seek a rigid hierarchical structure for 
society into which groups are vertically integrated.  In contrast, Ignazi groups the National Front, 
Freedom Party of Austria, and Vlaams Bloc into a post-industrial far-right family that espouses 
an ideology that is different than inter-war fascism.  He attributes this re-invented far-right to a 
society where rigid class barriers no longer exist, and thus cleavages in the contemporary society 
are cross-cutting making the supporters of these radical parties much more diverse than the 
traditional fascist base.   
 Kitschelt‟s far-right parties are split into four groups: fascist, welfare chauvinist, right-
authoritarian, and populist anti-statist.  Kitschelt believes contemporary fascist parties rely 
heavily upon charismatic, highly-visible leaders that appeal to frustrated elements in a society.  
                                                 
75
 Hagtvet, 241 
76
 Merkl, page 52 
 33 
These fascist parties rarely have an organizational structure that resembles mainstream parties, 
especially given the relatively limited number of party activists.
77
  Kitschelt‟s welfare chauvinist 
parties are characterized by support for the welfare state, as long as it is helping native-born 
citizens in need, and not “free-loading foreigners”.  Welfare-chauvinist parties are somewhat 
hostile to free-markets and typically espouse a desire to help the “little people”.  The right-
authoritarian parties are a synthesis of liberal pro-market sentiment and authoritarian ideology.  
Finally, Kitschelt‟s populist anti-statist parties are movements which rail against the established 
government and elite class, but are not to be grouped in with other far-right parties.
78
  
 Golder classifies far-right parties into two categories: neo-fascist and populist.  Golder 
maintains that these two types of radical right parties behave differently, and have had different 
degrees of success.  “The problem is that populist party elites and voters may be instrumental, 
whereas neo-fascist elites and voters may be expressive.  It may also be the case that populist 
voters are materialist, whereas neo-fascist supporters are ideational.”
79
  Golder argues that neo-
fascist parties have not enjoyed a surge in recent support, while populist parties have seen 
dramatic electoral gains in the last twenty years.   
 Van Der Brug et al. (2005) also look into this question of why some anti-immigrant 
parties succeed while others fail.  The 2005 study is remarkable in the sense that the author‟s 
model explains 83% of the variance in support for far-right parties.  Van Der Brug et al. maintain 
that in order for anti-immigrant parties to be successful, citizens must evaluate their position and 
generally agree with it.  The implications of this finding are that parties whose vote share is 
largely attributed to a protest vote phenomenon, will not sustain electoral success in the long-
term.  Merkl (2003) calls these protest parties‟ rapid success followed by a rapid implosion a 
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flash phenomenon that is often characteristic of far-right party success.  For Van Der Brug et al, 
in addition to voters agreeing with the party‟s anti-immigration stances, there must be a 
relatively weak threat posed by the parties on of the mainstream right.  This is very reminiscent 
of France in the early 1980‟s (the National Front‟s political breakthrough) when mainstream 
Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques Chirac began to distance himself and his party from the extreme 
anti-immigration stances of Le Pen‟s National Front.  Van Der Brug‟s study also finds that the 
more proportional the electoral system is, the greater the chance of a viable radical anti-
immigrant party.
80
    
 Other scholars have devoted attention to the question of why the radical right is currently 
so strong.  Robert Jackman and Karin Volpert (1996) believe that contemporary issues such as 
immigration and unemployment combined with electoral systems that foster multiple viable 
parties interact to create a political environment that is conducive to radical-right successes.  
Jackman and Volpert also find that policies can be implemented to reduce the threat of far-right 
parties such as raising threshold requirements for representation in parliament.    
 Matt Golder (2003) responds to the findings of Jackman and Volpert and refutes their 
arguments that proportional systems foster far-right parties and that by raising threshold 
requirements governments can reduce the vote share of parties on the radical right.  Golder 
questions the validity of Jackman and Volpert‟s measures noting that less than 10% of their 
observations fall into their category of plurality elections in single-member districts.  
Furthermore, Golder‟s analysis reveals that electoral thresholds have no effect at all on the 
extreme right when the effective number of parties ranges between 1.6 and 3.3 and notes that 
almost 50% of the observations fall within this range.
81
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 Pippa Norris‟ (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market is  rich in 
theories regarding the far-rights recent success.  Norris‟s book offers analysis of a variety of 
institutional features, political trends, and unique party environment which all could influence 
the level of electoral success far-right parties enjoy in their respective countries.  Norris‟ 
important work separates theories of the radical right into supply- side and demand- side 
arguments.  An example of a supply- side argument is the one that is prominently argued by 
political scientists such as Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann (1995).  Kitschelt and 
McGann have enhanced the literature with their argument that when political parties in a 
particular country undergo a period of platform convergence, a party on the far-right can 
experience a period of success as a reaction to this trend. According to this theory, conservatives 
unhappy with their mainstream party‟s drift towards the political center will rebel at the polls and 
support a far-right party closer to their proximity on the ideological continuum.  This is what 
Norris deems a supply-side argument in which the supply of far-right voters awaits a far-right 
political party to enter the market to satisfy their political needs.  Supply-side arguments in 
general focus their analysis on how radical-right parties reach voters with their message.  
Supply-side theories examine the leadership and programs of far-right parties and compare them 
with those of the mainstream parties.
82
   
In contrast, demand-side arguments are focused upon reactions or shocks to domestic or 
external events.  For example the events of September 11
th
, 2001 would certainly qualify as a 
significant milestone that was accompanied by a dramatic shift in public opinion on foreign 
policy matters in the United States.  Notable scholarly work that evokes demand-side 
explanations for changes in public opinion include that of Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro 
(1992) in which they offer reasons for the changing  public opinion throughout the post-war era 
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in the United States.  In regards to resurgence of far-right parties, demand-side arguments are 
often focused upon prominent socioeconomic issues such as immigration and dramatic change in 
policy (such as a period of greater deference to the supranational EU by the individual member-
states).  In sum, demand- side accounts feature dramatic changes that are accompanied by a 
period of demand for new parties to confront the impending crisis.                  
 Other scholars focus their work on institutional features that cultivate or occlude the rise 
of far-right parties to prominence in the political landscape.  These works are heavily influenced 
by a few classic studies that greatly enhanced our understanding of the enormous impact 
democratic institutions have upon the political environment.  Maurice Duverger‟s (1954) seminal 
work focused upon the electoral system‟s impact on the number of viable parties a democratic 
country would have.  What subsequently has been dubbed “Duverger‟s Law” states that 
majoritarian systems will be conducive to a two-party system where proportional systems will 
result in multi viable parties.  Thus, scholars such as Pippa Norris, Kai Arheimer, and Elisabeth 
Carter (2006) have investigated whether majoritarian electoral systems (characterized by first-
past-the-post elections in single-member districts) can depress support for far-right parties given 
the difficulties small parties have winning seats in this electoral system.  Both studies 
respectively found little support for the notion that majoritarian systems dissuade voters from 
voting for far-right parties.  Arzheimer and Carter presume perhaps that far-right voters are 
impervious to the structural obstacles smaller parties face in majoritarian electoral systems.  
However, another theory the authors present is that perhaps far-right voters are fundamentally 
different than other voters in the sense that they do not believe in casting a compromise or 
insincere vote for mainstream conservative parties just because they have a better chance of 
winning. 
 37 
 Recent studies have found advantages in majoritarian systems for smaller parties winning 
seats in the parliament.  Giovanni Sartori (1994) found that vote share that is highly concentrated 
can generate victories in a number of single-member districts that have plurality elections.  
Indeed, the Northern League‟s success supports this claim, winning a number of districts in 
Northern Italy during their plurality voting period that was disproportionate to their total national 
vote share.  In fact, the Northern League did not even run candidates in most of the districts in 
Central and Southern Italy.    
 The role federalism plays in the fortunes of radical right parties remains unclear.  
Arzheimer and Carter find evidence to support their conflicting hypotheses regarding this 
variable.  On the one hand, federalism may benefit radical right parties as voters may be willing 
to give them a chance to run a region or municipality.  However, conversely voters may see 
voting for a radical right party in local elections is an adequate display of a protest vote, and this 
could mitigate far-right parties to influential players in local and regional politics while having 
little influence as a national party.
83
       
 The role of the welfare state in determining the viability of radical right parties is also 
discussed in the literature.  Arend Lijphart (1968) (1984) famously argues that proportional 
representation results in governments that are kinder and gentler than their majoritarian 
counterparts.  Lijphart contends that these governments cultivate welfare states that alleviate 
many of social tensions that result in a society characterized by competing cleavages.  Lijphart 
also asserts that citizens who live in these countries are more satisfied with their governments 
than citizens in majoritarian systems. 
 Dwayne Swank and Hans-George Betz (2002) examine globalization and the welfare 
state‟s impact upon the success of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe.  Swank and 
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Betz find strong correlation between decreasing amounts of factory jobs in post-industrialist 
societies and an increase in support for far-right parties.  However, their study cautions that it is 
this shortage of factory jobs interacting with immigration that ultimately accounts for much of 
the success of far-right parties.  Nevertheless, the authors find that the presence of a universal 
welfare state suppresses support for parties on the radical right.  In addition, they find that 
traditional right parties adopting some of the more mainstream positions of the radical right can 
also hamper the latter‟s electoral fortunes.  
 Another body of literature regarding the resurgence of far-right movements focuses their 
studies upon the citizens that cast their ballots for radical- right parties.  A number of studies 
focus their attention on whether the support for radical right parties is an ideological or protest 
vote.  Wouter Van Der Brug et al. (2000) find that voters who support far-right parties generally 
do so for the same reasons that other voters support mainstream parties.
84
  However, the study 
finds that in some instances, there is a considerable distance on the ideological continuum 
between far-right parties and their voters, leading the authors to conclude that perhaps the French 
National Front, Italy‟s Northern League, and German Republikaner Party receive a large number 
of protest votes from citizens who are frustrated with the mainstream political parties. 
 Betz believes that the electoral success of the radical populist right can largely be 
attributed to psychological factors: notably the presence of large-scale socio-economic and 
structural changes.  However, Betz remains somewhat quiet in the debate over whether a vote for 
a radical- right party is an ideological or protest vote. 
 A number of studies (Norris 2005, Merkl 1997, 2003, Hainsworth 2000, Arzheimer 2006) 
examine support for radical- right parties by demographics.  There is a considerable degree of 
consensus in the scholarly community that far-right parties receive a disproportionate amount of 
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support from the petit bourgeoisie and unskilled manual labor classes.  Self-employed and white-
collar professionals are particularly attracted to Kitshelt‟s radical authoritarian class of right-
wing parties which emphasize pro-market solutions to problems.  Kitschelt‟s work (1995) on this 
issue suggest that perhaps these people who enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy in their 
professions begin to develop preferences for authoritarian styles of leadership which are 
commonly associated with the working class.
85
  Unskilled labor is attracted to anti-immigrant 
parties, especially in a climate of high unemployment coupled with an influx of immigrants.  
This demographic is sensitive to leaders such as Le Pen who typically point out that their jobs 
are increasingly going to immigrants. 
 Arzheimer and Carter find a U-shaped distribution of support for radical right parties by 
age, with both older and younger voters being more likely to cast their ballots for extreme right 
parties than their middle-aged counterparts.  In addition, their study along with many others, 
finds that males exhibit a greater propensity to vote for radical right parties than females.  
Arzheimer and Carter attribute their U-shaped distribution in age to weaker social integration 
amongst the oldest and youngest citizens in a society.  In addition, their study suggests that the 
oldest and youngest citizens are more likely to be on welfare than their counterparts, and thus 
may view immigrants as a threat to their state assistance.
86
     
 The social integration argument Arzheimer and Carter make resembles a prominent body 
of literature initiated by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba‟s seminal 1965 study of civic 
culture.  Robert Putnam (1993) revisited this topic with a groundbreaking study of modern Italy 
which revealed dramatic differences in social capital and trust of political institutions throughout 
Italy.  Putnam found that citizens living in Southern Italy, Sicily, or Sardinia (a region commonly 
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referred to as the Mezzogiorno) were less likely to belong to civic organizations such as church 
groups or civil societies and more likely to distrust political institutions than their counterparts in 
Northern or Central Italy.  In support of Alzheimer and Carter‟s argument, Southern Italy is a 
stronghold for Italy‟s neo-fascist AN. 
 Another study on civic culture I examined was that of Warde et al. (2003) in which they 
found that women were twice as likely as males to be involved in civic groups in Great Britain.  
With men being more likely than women to vote for radical right parties, there is an interesting 
correlation between social integration and support for radical right parties like Alzheimer and 
Carter suggest. 
 The final body of literature I examined identifies which countries might be next to 
experience success of radical right parties.  Kitschelt believes that Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, and Ireland all have economic and social conditions which could correspond with 
electoral gains for the far-right in the future.
87
   Michael O‟Connell (2003) conducted a study 
about the threat of radical right politics in Ireland.  O‟Connell‟s book asserts that Ireland, a 
traditionally homogenous country, has experienced a wave of immigration that had coincided 
with an anti-immigrant backlash amongst some groups in Irish society.  Disturbingly, O‟Connor 
finds that the Irish people answered four questions about immigrants differently in 1997 and 
2002 Eurobarometer and ISPAS surveys.  Almost 60% of Irish citizens in 2002 believed that 
immigrants were given preferential treatment in housing, a proportion which more than doubled 
since the 1997 Eurobarometer.  In addition, 70% (up from 50%) of Irish people believed that 
minorities in society abused social welfare and majorities of people answered that minorities 
increase unemployment and inhibit public education in 2002.
88
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 Nevertheless, some reports suggest that racism in Ireland may not be so rampant.  In 
2007, journalists lavished praise upon Dublin for acknowledging its diversity with a multi-
cultural parade to celebrate St Patrick‟s Day.  In addition, following a ban on homosexual groups 
marching in New York City‟s annual parade, an openly-gay member of that city‟s council opted 
to march in the Dublin parade while boycotting the festivities in his hometown.
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 Germany, of course, has a history of far-right political support which culminated in 
World War II.  Thus, when the Repbulikaner Party which was formed largely by disgruntled 
members of Bavaria‟s Christian Social Union (the sister party of Germany‟s Christian 
Democratic Party) scholars immediately took notice.  In 1989, the Republikaner Party had taken 
over 7% of the vote in local Bavarian elections and almost 8% of the vote for the European 
Parliament.
90
  Hans-George Betz (1990) investigated this development and found that it can be 
attributed to rapid social and economic change in then West Germany.  This rapid modernization 
threatened a number of groups within the society and they responded by breaking away from the 
traditional parties to support the far-right Republikaners.
91
  
 The literature devoted to the recent successes of radical right parties in Europe is rich in 
theory and explanations for this current trend.  However, as is the case with any relatively new 
topic, there are still a number of holes in the literature and factors to be explained.  Particularly 
lacking in the literature are studies that examine differences in far-right parties throughout 
Western Europe.  Most of the prior work attempts to either deal with this issue as European 
phenomenon or confine the focus to just one country that has experienced radical right success.  
In this study, I will focus on far-right voters in four countries: France, Italy, Austria, and 
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Belgium and discuss what supporters of these radical right movements have in common and 
what their differences are.    






















V. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 The contemporary literature regarding radical right parties is rich in theories that attempt 
to explain this phenomenon.  In this section, I will discuss several of the theories that are 
prominently advanced by previous studies and supported by empirical evidence.   
 A similar trend of de-alignment in many of the countries that have experienced resurgent 
radical-right parties seems to have helped facilitate their rise.  These de-alignment periods were 
ushered in by some type of shock which reinvigorated politics in systems that were largely 
deemed to be frozen.  In Italy and Austria, this was certainly the end of the Cold War, which had 
curtailed certain political options in those countries.  In Italy, the Christian Democrats had led 
every government in the post-war era, and formed coalitions with anybody they could to keep the 
Communist Party (PCI) out of the government.  Thus when the Italian political system almost 
simultaneously reels from an enormous scandal which implicated many Christian Democrats and 
a sudden and dramatic end to communism in Europe, it is not surprising to see Italian voters 
undergo a period of de-alignment and new parties emerging onto the scene.  A similar situation 
was the case in Austria, which found itself literally in between the democratic West and the 
communist East after World War II.  Like the Italian case, Austria‟s dominant Socialist Party 
was implicated in a series of scandals in the early 1980‟s, and voters began to become 
disenchanted with the status quo.   
 Italy and Austria both also experienced rapid modernization and economic gains in the 
late 1970‟s and early 1980‟s.  Previous work (Hainsworth, Merkl, Weinberg) suggests that these 
periods of modernization weaken traditional economic cleavages resulting in what Ronald 
Inglehart refers to as a post-materialization trend in society.  While the left in Europe struck first 
 44 
with the advent of the Greens, the right was quick to respond with an equal and opposite 
movement of its own which may be the recent successes of these radical- right parties. 
 In France, the weakening of socio-economic cleavages likely had a different impetus.  
When Francois Mitterrand was elected to the French Presidency in 1981, he and his Socialist 
allies in the French National Assembly embarked upon a campaign of nationalization, raising the 
minimum wage, and providing more benefits to French workers.  However, other prominent 
governments (notably Thatcher‟s in the UK and Reagan‟s in the US) were reigning in 
government spending at the same time, and Mitterrand‟s France soon found itself experiencing 
rampant inflation as a result of the government‟s fiscal policies.  In 1983, the Gaullists seized 
power in the National Assembly and the French had to embark upon measures to undo the 
policies of the previous government in an effort to curtail the deleterious effects of immigration.  
In the wake of this, there was a perceived convergence of the mainstream left and right parties in 
French politics; a condition that Pippa Norris argues is favorable to the success of far-right 
parties.
92
    
 There are several prominent demand-side theories in the literature for the success of far-
right parties.  The single-issue theory suggests that far-right parties take extreme stances on one 
issue, immigration, in hopes of striking a chord with voters who are frustrated about the 
mainstream parties‟ handling of that particular issue.  The single-issue theory states that these 
radical right parties will do their best in periods that are characterized by increasing levels of 
immigration.  The single-issue theory is perhaps best demonstrated in Austria, which saw a 
dramatic increase in immigration from Eastern Europe in the waning years of the Cold War.  
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However, the single-issue theory faces problems when confronted with the French case, as Front 
National focuses on a wide-variety of issues in French politics.
93
 
 The notion that recent successes of far-right parties are largely a result of voters casting a 
protest vote against the mainstream parties is another prevalent demand-side theory held by 
many scholars.  These theories suggest that radical-right parties have no actual ideology, but are 
merely organized negative attacks against the political establishment.
94
 
 There is a fair amount of evidence that a considerable amount of the vote share radical-
right parties receive is a protest vote.  Recall the discussion of Austria, where local members of 
the conservative Austrian OVP (Christian Democrats) in Carinthia were struggling what to do 
with the growing success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO).  Many of the local OVP 
members who advocated including the FPO in the regional government did so by suggesting 
failure to give them some power might actually increase their future electoral success.  Simply 
put, if far-right parties continue to have no say in how the country is led, they can continue to 
blame all of the government and society‟s shortcomings on the failures of the mainstream 
parties.   
 Protest theories also suggest that far-right parties are “socially unstructured or 
transient.”
95
  This means that they are prone to exhibit what is known as flash characteristics 
where they quickly emerge to prominence and subsequently experience a period of rapid decline.  
Italy‟s Northern League seems to fit this description, as it quickly is consolidated, participates in 
the Italian government, and is mitigated to obscurity.  
 Some scholars suggest that a period of social breakdown is occurring and facilitating the 
rise of far-right politics.  These theories assert that traditional social structures such as class and 
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religion have become less important and thus have left many individuals without a sense of 
belonging in their societies.  Roger Eatwell believes that young people in particular are 
vulnerable in this regard while Arzheimer and Carter believe both younger and older citizens 
may be prone to this type of thinking.  The latter study suggests this could explain the U-shaped 
distribution of support for far-right parties across the different age groups.  Eatwell suggests that 
these voters respond to the nationalist calls of far-right party who evoke a sense of pride in these 
young people‟s heritage.  Older citizens may be somewhat impervious to this nationalist tone 
because many have lived through times that were characterized by unbridled nationalism 
already.  Warde et al. (2003) did find that both younger citizens and men were involved in less 
civic organizations than older voters and females.  Thus I would expect to see an inverse 
relationship between participation in civic organizations and support for far-right parties.         
 Another prominent demand side argument for support of far-right parties is that it is a 
reaction against post-materialism.  The Greens in Europe rose to prominence in the 1970‟s 
espousing support for protection of the environment and equality before the law.  Inglehart 
attributes this voting behavior to citizens living in a society where their material concerns were 
met, but what about those for which this is not the case?  Younger males, especially the ones 
with low education and skill levels, likely do not enjoy a great degree of economic security.  
When parties make the argument that globalization and immigration exacerbate economic 
problems, it is not surprising that young male voters who are nervous about their financial 
situation would be attracted to that party.  These voters likely do not see parties such as the 
Greens as being sensitive to their concerns, and will support parties that focus on the materialist 
problems such as unemployment.   
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   This focus on economic concerns likely has accompanied the broadening of the bases 
that support far-right parties.  Recall my discussion of Austria in which I stated that Haider‟s 
commitment to seeing jobs go to native Austrians coincided with his Freedom Party‟s success 
amongst blue- collar workers in Vienna who had typically supported the Austrian socialists.  
Similarly in France when Le Pen makes statements that “2 million immigrants take the jobs that 
belong to 2 million Frenchmen” he is appealing to French citizens with unemployment concerns 
across the ideological left-right continuum.   
 The most prominent supply-side theory for the success of far-right parties is an 
encompassing political opportunity structure thesis.
96
  Pippa Norris devotes a considerable 
amount of attention to one supply-side theory that focuses upon platform convergence between 
the mainstream parties on the left and the right.  Norris and Kitschelt believe that when these 
right parties move towards the center on economic issues, they leave a void on the right which 
far-right parties can capitalize on to gain support.  France‟s National Front indeed had its 
breakthrough in the early 1980‟s when the French public became frustrated by a wave of 
immigration that the mainstream parties all ignored.   
 In other circumstances, the mainstream parties provide legitimacy to the far-right parties.  
This was particularly the case in Italy where Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia Party entered 
into a coalition with the National Alliance and the Northern League despite widespread concerns 
that the latter parties were not committed to the notion of representative democracy.  In addition, 
the Austrian OVP in Carinthia also broke with their national party‟s stance that the Freedom 
Party was beyond the pale when they entered into a coalition agreement with them.   
 In addition, some political opportunity structure arguments focus upon the institutional 
features such as electoral systems‟ role in aiding or occluding the success of radical right parties.  
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Conventional wisdom suggests that radical- right parties should have more success in countries 
that use proportional representation (PR) because citizens in these countries do not have the 
disincentives that majoritarian voters have to forego a vote for a minor party.  In PR systems, 
seats in the parliament are generally allocated to reflect the national popular vote.  In contrast, 
majoritarian systems designed on the Westminster Model are characterized by plurality elections 
in single-member districts.  In the latter system, not only is there an incentive to vote for the 
largest party that closely resembles the voter‟s ideology, there is also an incentive for parties to 
adopt a centrist platform to attract the median voter.  Thus, we should expect proportional 
representation systems to have viable parties that can run on a relatively extreme platform and 
voters who will support the parties that closely resemble their ideology.   
 Another common difference between proportional representation and majoritarian 
systems is that the former typically is characterized by multi-party systems while the latter is 
characterized by two-party systems.
97
  In multi-party systems, its is much more difficult for a 
single-party to garner the seats necessary to form the government, and thus parties in those 
systems are forced to enter into coalitions with other parties to achieve this task.
98
  Given that 
parties in PR systems have less incentives to adopt centrist positions and voters have more 
incentives to “vote their heart” we should expect far-right parties to do best in PR systems where 
vote share is spread amongst many different parties and thus these parties have to enter coalitions 
to form the government.  
 In Table 1, one can see that countries with higher percentages of governments that were 
composed of two or more parties in the post-war era were indeed more likely to have a far-right 
party with a significant level of support.  This makes the policies of the mainstream conservative 
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parties that concern cooperation with radical right parties even more important, as their 
willingness to collaborate could lead to the participation of far-right parties in the government 
which we have already seen has been the case in Italy and Austria.  
 
 




Country                          % Coalition Governments               Type of Radical Right Party 
 
Netherlands                                  100                                      Relevant 
Luxembourg                                 100                                      None 
Germany                                       95                                        Fringe 
Belgium                                        90                                        Relevant 
Finland                                          86                                        Fringe 
France                                           81                                        Relevant 
Italy                                               80                                        Relevant 
Austria                                          66                                        Relevant  
Denmark                                       57                                        Relevant   
Ireland                                           44                                        None 
Portugal                                        28                                         None  
Sweden                                         25                                         Fringe 
Norway                                         21                                         Relevant 
Greece                                           1                                           Fringe 
Spain                                             0                                           Fringe 




 Another burgeoning supply-side theory on the successes of the extreme right suggests 
that the media is often complicit in helping their fortunes.  While the media often rails against 
radical-right parties, it sometimes aids their success by positive stereotyping the native 
population and issuing blame on illegal immigrants.
100
  The media‟s coverage of crimes 
committed by illegal immigrants typically is framed in a manner in which the problem exceeds 
just one isolated case, but rather belongs in a series or pattern of crimes that are cause for alarm.  
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In the countries I have examined, there are specific circumstances in which media coverage 
aided far-right parties in a manner that goes beyond this more subtle trend. 
 In Austria, revelations that led to questions about the conservative presidential candidate 
Kurt Waldheim‟s war record ignited an investigation by the World Jewish Congress.  In response 
to this scrutiny, the media in Austria took a decidedly defensive position and much of their 
coverage of the incident was characterized by blatant anti-Semitism.  In Italy, far-right parties 
had an even more sympathetic ally in the media, largely as a result of Silvio Berlusconi‟s media 
empire that was certainly loyal to their owner and his Forza Italia party, and his political allies 
Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord.   
 However, France‟s Front National and its leader Jean Marie Le Pen have not faired as 
well in the French media.  Newspapers and magazines in France and around the world largely 
condemned Le Pen‟s participation in the second round of the 2002 presidential elections.  
Amidst the political fallout the first round generated, “The Economist” placed Le Pen on the 
cover of the reputable periodical with a heading that read “France‟s shame.”  Le Pen has often 
complained about what he refers to as the media‟s effort to demonize him and his supporters.  In 
his 2007 campaign, Le Pen has embarked upon a series of measures such as toning down his 
rhetoric and placing pictures of Le Pen supporters from different races on his website in hopes of 
expanding his base. 
 The national tradition theory is another supply-side explanation of far-right party 
successes.  Scholars who evoke these arguments for resurgent far-right parties argue that parties 
that succeed in characterizing their movement as part of their country‟s tradition will have a 
considerable amount of success at the polls.  This theory is often advanced by political scholars 
whose studies focus upon cultural variables to explain political trends.  The national tradition 
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theory also can explain the dramatic differences in support for far-right parties across similar 
Western European countries.  For example, a radical-right party in Germany would likely have a 
difficult time experiencing success due to the country‟s history of fascism and subsequent 
devastation.  In the UK, a far-right party would have an even more difficult time, because their 
country‟s tradition is proud for its resistance of fascist Germany to which many others 
capitulated.   However, in Italy, there is a tradition of fascism and a charismatic leader 
(Gianfranco Fini) who proudly boasts about its proud tradition there.  In contrast to Germany‟s 
case in which many citizens there suffered for 45 years as a result of their country‟s defeat in the 
Second World War, many Italians view their country‟s brand of fascism in a positive light that is 
reminiscent of Italy‟s glorious history.  In addition, historians in Italy have been more likely to 
normalize rather than demonize the fascist era in that country.
101
 
 The programmatic theory suggests that radical-right parties are not simply one-issue in 
nature, but are often characterized by a platform that deals with a variety of domestic and 
foreign-policy issues.  Implicit in the argument is that citizens who cast their ballots in favor of 
these parties do so not with the intent of casting a protest vote, but rather to reward the party that 
best represents their ideology and policy preferences.  Realizing this, radical-right parties are 
increasingly focusing their campaign on issues, not rhetoric, according to scholars who advance 
this programmatic theory. 
 A second aspect of this argument is that radical-right parties are increasingly employing a 
successful formula which combines authoritarian leadership with free-market policies.
102
  
Scholars are typically referring to these parties as populist, suggesting they are merely 
responding to prominent concerns in the electorate that other parties seem to be ignoring.  In the 
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Western European context, this can mean anything from an overbearing welfare state that far-




 Finally, with regard to the programmatic theory, far-right parties often adopt rhetoric that 
suggests they are neither a rightist nor a leftist party.  Critics of far-right parties also suggest that 
radical parties typically include terms such as “progressive” or “democratic” in their names, 
while being neither of these things.  Whether this is true or not, far-right parties that have a full 
platform are likely to combine extreme right positions on immigration with a variety of 
reasonable positions on a number of other issues in an attempt to expand their base.   
 The charismatic leader thesis is another prominent supply-side theory that seems to 
explain radical-right success when one examines a number of different cases.  This theory is 
predicated on the notion that far-right parties often lack the organizational structure of the 
mainstream parties, and instead have a charismatic leader who makes all the major decisions.  In 
every case I examined, there was a charismatic leader who seemingly single-handedly delivered 
their radical-right party from political marginalization.  These leaders must possess both a 
considerable degree of internal charisma, which means appealing to the party loyalists, and 
external charisma which means attracting new supporters.
104
 
 Roger Eatwell believes that charismatic theories, while easy to support, are difficult to 
examine empirically.  For starters, it is difficult to operationalize a variable such as charisma.  In 
addition, leaders like Umberto Bossi (Italy‟s Lega Nord) are often classified as charismatic 
despite his unkempt appearance and sharp tongue, which typically do not fit most people‟s 
conception of charismatic.  Furthermore, leaders like Jean Marie Le Pen have experienced not 
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only a considerable amount of high-level defections from the party (a lack of internal charisma) 
but also face a relatively hostile majority who are put off by gaffes regarding the Holocaust (a 
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VI. VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
 The study I am undertaking examines voters in four countries: France, Italy, Austria, and 
Belgium. My study focuses upon the relationship between several independent variables and the 
dependent variable of which party did each of the respondents vote for.  For each country, I will 
examine the relationship between trust in both domestic and supranational political institutions 
and support for political parties.  Building on previous literature, I hypothesize that citizens who 
voted for far-right parties are less likely to trust both their country‟s parliament and the European 
Parliament.  I believe this will be the case as radical-right voters are often thought of as casting a 
protest vote against the political establishment that they feel does not have their interests in mind.  
In addition, prior research suggests that far-right voters are often relatively vulnerable 
economically, and are more likely to believe both that they have to compete with immigrants for 
jobs and that their country‟s economic progress has left them behind.  Their frustration is often 
compounded by their belief that many of the mainstream parties ignore their concerns.  For these 
reasons, I believe that radical-right voters will be less likely to trust their respective parliament.  
Previous studies also suggest that far-right voters (or all extreme voters) are more likely to be 
Euroskeptic than mainstream voters, believing that increased European integration does not have 
their best interests in mind.  Thus, I expect to find that in addition to not trusting their own 
Parliament, far-right voters will also be less likely to trust the only democratically elected 
institution of the European Union, the European Parliament.   
 In addition to the having less trust in the domestic and European political institutions, I 
expect to find that far-right voters will be less likely to be interested in politics than voters of 
their countries‟ other major parties.  These variables may be related in the sense that if these 
citizens do not trust the political institutions, they may be less likely to care about the political 
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races to elect officers to them.  However, the flip side of this could be that voters who distrust 
these institutions may be very responsive to a candidate who expresses similar concerns, making 
radical-right voters more likely to be engaged in political affairs.   
 Included in my theory section of this paper is discussion about the political opportunity 
for radical-right parties to breakthrough into domestic politics.  Typically present in this scenario 
is a sense that the platforms of the major parties have converged leaving many voters on the 
ideological continuum without a party that resembles their ideology or policy preferences.  This 
being said, I expect to find that voters who cast their ballots in favor of far right parties will be 
less likely than their counterparts to think that politicians in general care about what people like 
them think. 
 Finally, I will test a prominent theory which attempts to explain far-right support, the role 
of immigrants in society.  I expect to find that citizens who support far-right parties are more 












VII. DATA AND METHODS 
 My data source for this study is the 2002 European Social Survey which asks European 
citizens a variety of societal, political, and economic questions.  The relatively large scope of the 
dataset is indeed an asset, and it asked respondents who they voted for in the last parliamentary 
elections, which is my study‟s dependent variable.  One drawback of the data source was that I 
could not obtain a copy of the dataset and thus was forced to conduct my analysis on the ESS 
website, which was problematic for two reasons.  To begin with, I was unable to isolate far-right 
voters by turning my dependent variable into a dichotomous dependent of whether of not the 
respondent supported a radical-right party.  Additionally, the ESS does not list the parties in an 
ordered manner left to right manner, thus regression analysis could not be conducted.  In lieu of 
this, I have conducted Crosstab analyses to offer some insight into why voters cast their ballots 













VIII. DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
 The first independent variables I will discuss is the trust in Parliament across the four 
countries my study examines.  In Table 2, is the level of trust citizens have in their Parliament by 
political party in France.  The ESS measures trust on an 11-point scale which ranges from “no 
trust at all” or “0” to “complete trust” or “10”.  I have condensed the 11-point scale into 3 
categories: No Trust at all-3, Moderate Trust (4-6), and 7-Complete Trust.  The parties included 
in the table from left-right ideologically are the French Communists (PC), the French Socialists 
(PS), the centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF), the right-wing Union for the Popular 
Majority (UMP), and the radical-right National Front (FN).  
 
Table 2: Trust in French Parliament by Party Vote
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             No Trust-3                Moderate Trust (4-6)            7- Complete Trust 
Party 
PC                       36.2%                               52.6%                                      11.2%                                                                                     
PS                       29.6%                                49.7%                                      20.6% 
UDF                      9.5%                                53.9%                                      36.5% 
UMP                    11.4%                               57.1%                                      31.5% 
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Table 3: Trust in European Parliament in France by Party Vote
107
 
  No Trust-3                     Moderate Trust (4-6)          7-Complete Trust 
Party 
PC                       41.6%                               47.2%                                     11.2% 
PS                       29.3%                                53.0%                                     17.0% 
UDF                    23.5%                                49.0%                                     27.4% 
UMP                   25.9%                                55.2%                                     18.9% 
FN                       53.4%                              37.8%                                      8.8% 
  
As the reader can see, citizens who cast their ballot in favor of the radical-right Front 
National (FN) were much more likely to distrust both the French National Assembly and the 
European Parliament.  Over 50% of voters who supported Front National answered that they had 
almost no trust in either of these political institutions, which was a double-digit difference from 
any other major French party and almost twice the rate of the centrist UDF.  In France, what 
these results reveal is there is a parabolic distribution for trust across the left-right ideological 
continuum with both the far-left Communists and the far-right Front National voters being less 
likely to trust the domestic and EU institutions than voters in the center, center-left, and center-
right respectively.   
 The same test was performed for the Italian case with the parties being ordered from left-
right starting with the Italian Communists (PCI), Italian Socialists (PSI)*
108
, the right-wing Forza 
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 * The PSI was the former Italian Socialist party which has essentially been replaced by a coalition of Italian 
Parties on the center-left that are often referred to as the Olive Tree alliance. 
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Italia (FI), and two ultra-right parties Lega Nord (LN), and Alleanza Nazionale (AN).
109
  The 
results did not conform to my hypothesis like the French case did.  As is borne out by the 
evidence, voters who cast their ballots in support of the Italian radical-right parties exhibited 
similar, if not greater, levels of trust in both the Italian Parliament and European Parliament 
when compared with voters who supported the other major Italian parties. 
 
Table 4: Trust in Italian Parliament by Party Vote
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  No Trust-3                Moderate Trust (4-6)            7-Complete Trust 
Party 
PCI                      22.2%                             66.6%                                    11.1% 
PSI                      25.5%                              48.5%                                    26.0% 
FI                        22.8%                              50.0%                                     27.0% 
LN                      18.2%                              45.4%                                   36.4% 
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Table 5: Trust in European Parliament in Italy by Party Vote
111
 
  No Trust-3                      Moderate Trust (4-6)          7- Complete Trust 
Party 
PCI                      11.1%                                77.7%                                   11.1% 
PSI                        7.6%                                 47.8%                                   44.1% 
FI                         18.2%                                47.5%                                   30.3% 
LN                       18.2%                               27.3%                                   54.5% 
AN                       11.3%                               62.9%                                   25.8% 
 
 While I had predicted that all the far-right voters would indicate less trust in political 
institutions than their counterparts, I suspected Italy might have a different result.  The AN is a 
bit of an anomaly amongst far-right parties in the sense that it has a relatively poor base that 
relies heavily on governmental assistance.  The AN‟s base is located primarily in southern Italy‟s 
Mezzogiorno region which has long lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of economic 
development.  In the last 30 years, the Italian government has embarked upon considerable 
measures to dramatically increase investment (and offer incentives for private companies and 
individuals to do so) to decrease the gap in economic prosperity between Italy‟s poor south and 
prosperous north.  Robert Putnam‟s 1994 study indicated that despite this, the Italian south still 
lagged far behind the north in economic prosperity, institutional performance, and trust of 
political institutions.  This simple test, however, could indicate perhaps trust in institutions is on 
the rise since Putnam conducted his landmark study.  However, given that my study does not 
examine this question by region, the reader should take this observation with a grain of salt.  
Indeed, Alleanza Nazionale does have considerable support in all of Italy‟s regions, and I have 
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no way of knowing the regional breakdown of the Alleanza Nazionale support in the 2002 ESS 
dataset.    
 The results for Lega Nord are a complete surprise, given that its leader Umberto Bossi 
has not only expressed complete disdain for Italy‟s Parliament, but also the idea of a unified Italy 
in general.  Bossi and his supporters believe that northern Italy should become a sovereign state 
called Padania.  The odd results can likely be attributed to the excessively small sample of Lega 
Nord voters (11).   
 While I have attempted to attribute the relatively strong trust Alleanza Nazionale voters 
have in Italy‟s Parliament to the economic assistance many voters have received from the 
government, I am surprised they also have this trust for the European Parliament.  This result 
was highly unexpected and counter-intuitive as we generally believe that far-right parties and 
their voters are somewhat skeptical of the supranational EU. 
 This result was most prominently seen in my results for Austria, where there was a 
dramatic difference in trust for Austria‟s Parliament and trust for the European Parliament 
amongst the radical Freedom Party‟s (FPO) voters.  Like the previous cases, the parties are in 
Austria are organized from left-right starting with the Grune (Greens), Socialists (SPO), 
conservatives (OVP), and radical right (FPO). 
The FPO voters revealed a similar level of trust in the Austrian Parliament compared to 
the voters of the other political parties.  However, FPO voters were much more likely to distrust 
the European Parliament than the voters who supported the mainstream Austrian parties.  The 
FPO respondents indicated that they had almost no trust in the European Parliament at a rate of 
61.6% which was more than double the proportion of Greens who answered the same way 
(29.8%).  Only 8.2% of FPO voters expressed high-complete levels of trust which was roughly 
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Table 6: Trust in Austrian Parliament by Party Vote
112
 
    
No Trust-3            Moderate Trust (4-6)        7-Complete Trust 
Party 
Grune  22.7%   44.1%    33.2% 
SPO  28.2%   45.3%    26.5% 
OVP  18.0%   48.7%    33.3% 
FPO  33.7%   37.8%    28.5%   
 
 
Table 7: Trust in European Parliament in Austria by Party Vote
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            No Trust-3        Moderate Trust (4-6)      7-Complete Trust 
Party 
Grune  29.8%   50.4%    19.8%    
SPO  41.4%   40.5%    18.1% 
OVP  38.0%   46.0%    16.0% 
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 half of the conservative OVP‟s proportion (the second least-trust Austrian partisans of the 
EP).  
 This result is not surprising, and reveals the Austrian far-right‟s longstanding suspicion of 
the European Union and the democratic West in general.  Austria‟s radical-right indeed often 
makes favorable references to Germany‟s Third Reich and many of the policies of Adolf Hitler.  
Many Austrians in general have been quite suspicious of the West, and the country preferred to 
be neutral throughout much of the Cold War.  Nevertheless, the Austrians generally did not want 
their government to succumb to the pressure of the Soviet Union, and thus joined many of the 
Western institutions solely to stave off this threat from the East. 
 The Austrian far-right‟s contemporary opposition to the EU likely reflects their fears over 
Eastern European immigration into Austria as a result of the supranational institution‟s 
expansion into that region.  Austria has experienced a strong wave of immigration from the east 
since the termination of the Cold War, and as I discussed earlier, this has increased the FPO‟s 
votes share amongst voters all over the ideological continuum as it has been the one party that 
has adopted a decidedly anti-immigrant rhetoric.   
The Flemish nationalist Vlaams Blok voters exhibited trust levels in both the Belgian and 
European Parliaments that were far below their counterparts in six other major Belgian parties.  I 
thought the most striking finding in the Belgian case is how similar the trust levels were amongst 
voters of the other six major parties which cross-cut Belgium‟s deep-rooted lingual divide.  
Vlaams Blok sticks out as a considerable outlier with its voters exhibiting very similar low levels 
of trust in their domestic and European Parliament as the voters of France‟s Front National. 
 Thus, the question now is how did far-right voters compare to each other in levels of trust 
in domestic parliament and the supranational EP.   
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Table 8: Trust in Belgian Parliament by Party Vote
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       No Trust-3 Moderate Trust (4-6)       7- Complete Trust 
Party 
Agalev   16.7%   45.6%   37.7%    
Ecolo   16.7%   53.7%   29.6% 
SP   14.8%   54.8%   30.4% 
PS   25.7%   53.7%   20.6% 
VLD   16.4%   54.7%   28.8% 
CVP   14.5%   49.4%   36.1% 
VB   53.8%   41.0%    5.1% 
Table 9: Trust in European Parliament in Belgium by Party Vote
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  No Trust-3     Moderate Trust (4-6) 7- Complete Trust 
Party 
Agalev            11.9%      51.6%      36.5% 
Ecolo            19.3%      49.0%      31.6% 
SP            23.2%      51.2%      25.6%  
PS            31.1%      55.4%      12.5% 
VLD            21.8%      54.1%       24.1%  
CVP            18.2%      48.6%       33.2% 
VB            53.3%      38.7%         8.0% 
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The Flemish nationalist Vlaams Blok voters exhibited trust levels in both the Belgian and 
European Parliaments that were far below their counterparts in six other major Belgian parties.  I 
thought the most striking finding in the Belgian case is how similar the trust levels were amongst 
voters of the other six major parties which cross-cut Belgium‟s deep-rooted lingual divide.  
Vlaams Blok sticks out as a considerable outlier with its voters exhibiting very similar low levels 
of trust in their domestic and European Parliament as the voters of France‟s Front National. 
 Thus, the question now is how did far-right voters compare to each other in levels of trust 
in domestic parliament and the supranational EP.  Table 10 (below) and Table 11 compare levels 
of trust exhibited by far-right voters cross-nationally. 
 
Table 10: Trust in Domestic Parliament amongst Far-Right Voters 
No Trust-3          Moderate Trust (4-6)            7-Complete Trust 
Party 
FN                       56.2%                             29.2%                                   14.6% 
LN                       18.2%                             45.4%                                   36.4% 
AN                       16.9%                             61.5%                                   21.6% 
FPO       33.7%          37.8%        28.5%   







Table 11: Trust in European Parliament amongst Far-Right Voters 
No Trust-3          Moderate Trust (4-6)            7-Complete Trust 
Party 
FN                       53.4%                               37.8%                                      8.8% 
LN                       18.2%                               27.3%                                     54.5% 
AN                       11.3%                               62.9%                                     25.8% 
FPO       61.6%            30.1%    8.2% 
VB       53.3%            38.7%                          8.0% 
 
 Analysis of the crosstabs results for levels of trust in domestic and supranational political 
institutions suggests a great deal of disparity amongst far-right voters across country lines.  The 
Italian far-right parties exhibited a high level of political trust in both the Italian and European 
Parliaments which largely resembled the views expressed by supporters of the mainstream Italian 
parties.  The Austrian FPO exhibited a similar level of trust in the Austrian Parliament when 
compared to their mainstream counterparts, but revealed a sharp difference when the focus 
became the European Parliament, with the Austrian FPO voters being much less likely to trust 
the EP than their mainstream counterparts.  The French FN and the Belgian VB voters exhibited 
a lack of trust in both their countries‟ Parliaments and the EP. 
 With the notable exception of Austria, far-right voters exhibited a similar level of trust in 
their domestic parliament and the European Parliament.  Majorities of the FN (53.4%), FPO 
(61.6%), and VB (53.3) indicated that they do not trust the European Parliament; an expected 
result given previous research indicates that the radical-right is typically viewed as suspicious of 
supranational institutions.     
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 The second independent variable I examined was interest in politics of voters for each 
major political party in the four countries I have examined.  The ESS measures interest on a 4-pt 
scale that includes the responses of “Very Interested”, “Quite Interested”, “Hardly Interested”, 
and “Not Interested”.  In Tables 12-16, the reader can see how each far-right party‟s voters 
compared to voters of the other major parties in their respective country. 
Table 12: Interest in Politics by Party in France
116
 
      Very Interested    Quite Interested    Hardly Interested  Not Interested 
Party 
PC  22.2%   41.7%   30.6%    5.6%  
PS  16.7%   35.1%   36.9%   11.3% 
UDF   9.6%   46.2%   38.4%    5.8% 
UMP  15.6%   42.2%   33.9%    8.3% 
FN   8.3%   20.8%   33.3%   37.5% 
 
Table 13: Interest in Politics by Party in Italy
117
 
     Very Interested     Quite Interested         Hardly Interested      Not Interested 
Party 
PCI     0   22.2%   55.6%   22.2% 
PSI  17.4%   38.3%   28.1%   16.2% 
FI   8.0%   32.2%   35.6%   24.1% 
LN  27.3%   18.2%   45.5%   9.1%  
AN  18.5%   43.1%   27.7%   10.8% 
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Table 14: Interest in Politics by Party in Austria
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       Very Interested          Quite Interested          Hardly Interested Not Interested 
Party 
Grune  26.7%   50.0%   19.8%   3.4% 
SPO  23.2%   39.9%   27.7%   9.2% 
OVP  24.8%   42.3%   27.0%   5.9% 
FPO  22.7%   46.7%   25.3%   5.3% 
 
Table 15: Interest in Politics by Party in Belgium
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         Very Interested          Quite Interested        Hardly Interested    Not Interested 
Party 
Agalev   7.7%   50.5%   33.0%   8.8% 
Ecolo  10.3%   46.6%   39.7%   3.4% 
SP  11.5%   48.2%   28.8%   11.5% 
PS  10.9%   28.7%   34.9%   25.6% 
VLD   8.2%   50.4%   31.0%   10.3% 
CVP   9.3%   38.6%   28.9%   23.2% 
VB  10.3%   38.5%   24.4%   26.9% 
 
 Contrary to my expectations, voters who cast their ballots for radical-right parties did not 
indicate levels of interest in politics that differed dramatically from their mainstream 
counterparts in Austria or Belgium.  In Italy, the relationship again was the opposite of the 
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predicted direction, with Italian far-right AN and LN voters being more likely to say they were 
interested in politics than the voters of the mainstream parties in Italian politics.  The one radical-
right party whose voters expressed an interest of voters that reflected what I hypothesized was 
France‟s Front National.  Only roughly 30% of FN voters said they were either very or quite 
interested in politics while majorities in every other party in French politics indicated they were 
interested or quite interested.  Additionally an astounding 37.5% of FN voters indicated they had 
no interest in politics, a proportion that was more than three times greater than the next least- 
interested French Socialists (11.3%).  Similar to the results for levels of political trust, far-right 
respondents exhibited considerable differences when compared cross-nationally.   
 
Table 16: Interest in Politics Expressed by Far-Right Voters 
           Very Interested    Quite Interested    Hardly Interested  Not Interested 
Party 
FN   8.3%   20.8%   33.3%   37.5% 
LN  27.3%   18.2%   45.5%    9.1%  
AN  18.5%   43.1%   27.7%   10.8% 
FPO  22.7%   46.7%   25.3%    5.3% 
VB  10.3%   38.5%   24.4%   26.9% 
 
The respondents who voted for the FN and the VB expressed comparatively low interest 
in politics with 37.5% and 26.9% indicating they were not interested, respectively.  In addition 
supporters of these parties were also least likely to indicate that they were very interested in 
politics with only 8.3% and 10.3% expressing strong political interest.   The AN, LN, and FPO 
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were comparatively more interested, and those who voted for the Italian far-right parties actually 
showed the highest level of political interest than any other bloc of voters in Italian politics. 
The third independent variable my study includes is the belief in whether or not 
politicians generally care about average citizens by party.  As I have mentioned, previous studies 
suggest that a period of mainstream party platform convergence often is followed by 
considerable success of a far-right party because a substantial amount of voters are left 
unrepresented by centrist ideology and policy preferences.  For this reason, I have hypothesized 
that far-right voters are more likely to think that politicians do not care about people like them 
than other voters.  In Tables 17-21, I have included the results of the crosstab tests. 
 
Table 17: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (France)
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     Hardly Any  Very Few             Some     Most 
Party 
PC         19.4%   38.9%   36.1%       0   
PS         23.1%   31.7%   38.4%     4.6% 
UDF         11.8%   21.6%   52.9%    11.8%   
UMP         10.9%   29.2%   50.0%      6.8% 
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Table 18: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (Italy)
121
 
  Hardly Any  Very Few  Some   Most   
Party 
PCI       22.2%  55.6%   22.2%      0 
PSI       23.4%  26.9%   36.5%      9.6% 
FI       18.5%  37.0%   32.9%      6.4% 
LN       27.2%  36.4%   36.4%       0 
AN       26.6%  29.7%   32.8%       9.4% 
 
Table 19: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (Austria)
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           Hardly Any           Very Few                    Some                 Most 
Party 
Grune    21.5%    29.8%  39.9%      6.6% 
SPO    27.6%    35.2%  29.4%      6.2% 
OVP    23.6%    29.5%  36.4%      9.1% 
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Table 20: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (Belgium)
123
 
  Hardly Any    Very Few  Some       Most 
Party 
Agalev     10.0%     23.3%  47.8%       16.7% 
Ecolo     10.3%     29.3%  51.7%         5.2% 
SP     10.1%     31.2%  45.7%         8.0% 
PS     19.5%     40.6%  34.4%         3.9% 
VLD     10.4%     33.8%  40.7%          9.5% 
CVP       9.9%     29.6%  47.3%          8.6% 
VB      30.3%     40.8%  21.1%          2.6% 
 
Table 21: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (far-right) 
             Hardly Any                  Very Few                Some                   Most 
Party 
FN      41.7%      35.4%  20.8%        2.1%                                                 
LN      27.3%      36.4%  36.4%         0 
AN      26.6%      29.7%  32.8%         9.4% 
FPO      34.7%      28.0%  28.0%         6.7% 
VB      30.3%      40.8%  21.1%         2.6% 
 
 Again in regard to the notion of whether or not politicians generally care about people 
like them, the Front National voters in France and Vlaams Blok voters in Belgium responded in a 
manner that was similar to each other and considerably different than the other voters in their 
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country.  France‟s National Front voters were almost twice as likely as French Socialists (the 
closest party) to answer that hardly any politicians care about what they think (41.7% to 23.1%)  
The mainstream Belgian parties answered the question very similarly with large majorities 
answering that very few or some politicians care about what people like them think.  However a 
much higher proportion of VB voters indicate that hardly any politicians care what they think, 
and over 70% of the VB respondents fell into the first two categories of very few or hardly any 
politician caring.  In fact, a majority of respondents for every far- right party fell into these first 
two categories.  Additionally, it is worth mentioning that every Austrian party also had a 
majority of respondents falling into these two categories, and the same can be said about the 
Italian Communists who had an overwhelming 77.8% of respondents answer the question in this 
manner which is a proportion which is almost 20% greater than the French Communists. 
The independent variable I examined was the degree to which people who voted for a 
party believed immigrants take away or create jobs in the economy.  The ESS measures this 
question on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (Immigrants take away jobs) to 10 (Immigrants 
create new jobs).  I have again collapsed the eleven ESS categories into three: 0-3 (Immigrants 
take away jobs), 4-6 (immigrants probably take away and create new jobs), and 7-10 (immigrants 







Table 22: Perceived Effect Immigrants have on Jobs by Party (France)
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    Take Away-3    4-6   Create New Jobs 
Party 
PC         19.5%   64.0%    16.5%  
PS         15.4%   54.2%    30.4% 
UDF           7.6%   69.2%    23.0% 
UMP          25.1%   62.2%    12.5% 
FN          60.5%   35.4%     4.1% 
 
Table 23: Perceived Effect Immigrants Have on Jobs by Party (Italy)
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  Take Away-3               4-6   Create New Jobs 
Party 
PCI      44.4%   44.4%    11.1% 
PSI      26.6%   48.8%    24.6% 
FI      33.5%   45.3%    20.9% 
LN      54.5%   27.3%    18.2% 
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 N= 36 PC, 277 PS, 52 UDF, 191 UMP, and 48 FN 
125
 N= 9 PCI, 162 PSI, 170 FI, 11 LN, and 65 AN 
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Table 24: Perceived Effect Immigrants Have on Jobs by Party (Austria)
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  Take Away-3   4-6   Create New Jobs 
Party 
Grune      11.8%   58.3%    29.9% 
SPO      26.8%   58.0%    15.2% 
OVP      21.2%   67.0%    11.8% 
FPO      37.1%   57.1%      5.7% 
 
 
Table 25: Perceived Effect of Immigrants on Jobs by Party (Belgium)
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  Take Away-3      4-6   Create New Jobs 
Party 
Agalev         16.0%       72.4%   11.4% 
Ecolo         22.3%                  59.2%   22.4% 
SP         18.7%       62.7%   18.6% 
PS         42.4%       50.4%     7.2% 
VLO         23.8%       66.4%     9.7% 
CVP         28.6%       58.1%    13.2% 
VB         46.6%       46.7%      6.7% 
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 N= 221 Grune, 465 SPO, 503 OVP, and 70 FPO 
127





Table 26: Perceived Effect of Immigrants on Jobs by Party (Far-Right) 
  Take Away-3      4-6   Create New Jobs 
Party 
FN        60.5%       35.4%   4.1% 
LN        54.5%       27.3%             18.2% 
AN        24.6%       60.0%             15.3% 
FPO        37.1%       57.1%    5.7% 
VB        46.6%       46.7%    6.7% 
 
The results for the immigration question revealed that France‟s Front National voters 
were the most likely of any party in the four countries I examined to believe that immigrants take 
away jobs with a solid 60.5% of FN respondents expressing this belief.  Evidently Le Pen‟s 
rhetoric of “2 million immigrants take the jobs of 2 million Frenchmen” has gained some traction 
with French voters, especially amongst those with lower skills sets who believe they are most 
likely to have their job taken by an immigrant worker.   
Voters who supported Vlaams Blok and the Freedom Party of Austria were also the most 
likely in their respective countries to indicate that immigrants take away jobs.  It should be noted 
that in both cases, Socialists were the second most likely to express this belief, and in Belgium 
there was only a 4% difference between French-speaking Socialists and Vlaams Blok voters who 
indicated that immigrants take away jobs (46.6% to 42.4% respectively).  As I mentioned earlier, 
the FPO in particular was able to expand its base into Vienna‟s working class neighborhoods, a 
traditional stronghold of the Austrian Socialists due to anxiety these blue-collar voters felt about 
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the influx of Eastern European immigrants into Austria which coincided with the end of the Cold 
War.   
Alleanza Nazionale voters again did not answer as I expected.  60.0% of AN respondents 
fell into the moderate category on immigration and AN voters were the least likely of the major 
parties in Italian parties to indicate they believed immigration took away jobs.  In contrast, the 
Italian Communists, Lega Nord, and Forza Italia voters expressed concern about immigrants and 
jobs at relatively high levels, despite a prominent belief that the Italian society is rapidly aging, 
and thus the Italian economy will likely face a labor shortage in the near future.   
The study I have undertaken tests hypotheses that relate to theories about institutional 
trust and far-right voting, political interest and far-right voting, protest vote theory, and the 
beliefs voters have about immigration and job security.  In regard to institutional trust, France‟s 
Front National and Belgium‟s Vlaams Blok voters indicated much lower levels of trust in their 
countries‟ parliaments than the voters who cast their ballots in support of mainstream parties.  
While indicating similar levels in trust of the Austrian Parliament as the other Austrian parties, 
the FPO voters revealed a high level of distrust for the supranational European Parliament, an 
expected result given the Austrian far-right‟s longstanding suspicion of the EU.   
France‟s FN voters also indicated low interest in politics with 70% of Front National 
voters indicating they were not or were hardly interested in political affairs.  This was nearly 
twice the proportion of Italian AN voters who answered the question in the same way, and the 
AN and LN voters in Italy were the most likely of any Italian voters to be very or quite interested 
in politics.  The Austrian FPO voters indicated similar levels of interest compared with voters 
who cast their ballots for mainstream parties, and the same can be said for Vlaams Blok voters in 
Belgium.  However, the latter (along with Belgium‟s French-speaking Socialists and Christian 
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Democrats) indicated levels of disinterest in politics at a rate that was twice that of the voters for 
the other parties in Belgian politics. 
The only variable in my study in which every far-right party‟s voters compared to the 
other voters in their respective systems in the same way was the question that asked if politicians 
care what people like the respondent think.  Every far-right party‟s voters were the most likely to 
think that hardly any politicians care about what people like them think.  The effect was biggest 
in France and Belgium where 41.7% of Front National voters and 30.3% of Belgian Vlaams 
Blok voters answered the question in this manner.  I believe these findings offer considerable 
evidence for the protest theory, which suggests far-right voters cast protest votes against parties 
they believe don‟t have their interests in mind.  Perhaps it is this notion that politicians don‟t care 
about people that leads many of these voters to support parties that rail against the complacent 
and out-of-touch government that doesn‟t represent them. 
In regard to immigration, all of the far-right voters except those who cast their ballot in 
favor of Alleanza Nazionale were the most likely to express the belief that immigrants take away 
jobs.  The effect was again strongest in France, with 60.5% of Front National voters expressing 
this concern.  In Austria and Belgium, the far-right voters were most likely to have this point of 
view, but they were followed closely by Socialists whose blue-collar voters had similar beliefs.  
This finding emphasizes the ability of far-right parties to attract voters from across the 
ideological spectrum by appealing to their concerns on issues such as immigration that many of 
the traditional, mainstream parties would prefer not to deal with. 
Overall, I think the most important finding of my study was the amount of variance 
amongst the far-right voters cross-nationally.  Many people have a stereotypical sense of far-
right voters that they attempt to apply universally.  In agreement with previous studies, I would 
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suggest that these parties are indeed products of their unique political system with quite different 
appeals and vote bases.   
However, as far-right parties continue to participate in a significant way in politics, there 
will be a demand for more studies to investigate this phenomenon.  The study I have conducted 
offers some insight into four countries where the radical-right has experienced a considerable 
level of success, but there is room for both more in-depth studies on these cases, and especially 
the cases where the far-right parties have thus far failed to be a relevant force in their country‟s 
politics.  In addition, the current literature can be enhanced by both elaborate case studies that 
offer insight into one far-right party‟s situation and studies that examine far-right movements in a 
large number of countries.  The latter body of work will be particularly needed as new far-right 















 The far-right‟s recent successes in politics have caused considerable alarm in countries 
where these movements have gained traction, and abroad where opponents hope they will not.  
In Austria and Italy, the far-right has already participated in the governing coalition, indicating 
both a level of strength and clout which worries there domestic opponents and observers abroad.  
With Bulgaria and Romania‟s recent accession into the European Union, the far-right now has a 
recognized and funded caucus in Identity, Sovereignty, and Tradition which may prove to be a 
difficult force to contend with inside the European Parliament. 
 The far-right‟s success has come at a period of transition for Europe, as it moves closer 
towards uniting its eastern and western regions which were so bitterly divided in the second half 
of the twentieth century.  In addition, the European Union faces the difficult task of getting all its 
member states to agree to a constitution which will establish the ground rules for some time to 
come.  In this period of rapid economic and political changes, it is clear some voters have 
concerns that they feel are not being addressed by the mainstream parties, and thus are reaching 
out to far-right parties in frustration.  In upcoming elections in the recent future, we may gather 
some insight into whether this far-right party success was a temporary phenomenon or if these 
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PARTIES AND ABBREVIATIONS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY  
 
Radical Right Parties 
FN = Front National (France) 
AN= Alleanza Nazionale (Italy) 
LN= Lega Nord (Italy) 
FPO= Freedom Party of Austria 
VB = Vlaams Blok 
 
France 
PC= Communist Party 
PS= Socialist Party 
UDF= Union for French Democracy 
UMP= Union for the Popular Movement 
 
Italy 
PCI = Communist Party 
PSI= Socialist Party 
FI= Forza Italia 
 
Austria 
Grune = Green 




Agalev = Flemish-speaking Greens 
Ecolo= French-speaking Greens 
SP= Flemish-speaking Socialists 
PS= French-speaking Socialists 
VLD= Flemish liberal Party 
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